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INTRODUCTION: SPEECH AS CONDUCT
When, if ever, should speech lose its First Amendment protection
on the grounds that it's really just conduct? Let us set aside restric-
tions of speech or expressive conduct based on its noncommunicative
aspects, for instance because the speakers are blocking traffic or are
being too loud.' Rather, let's focus on situations in which speech is
restricted because of the harm that flows from its content.
Consider, for instance, a book that explains the steps necessary to
commit a particular crime. May this speech be restricted on the
grounds that it constitutes the "conduct" of aiding and abetting, and is
thus not subject to First Amendment protection at all? Or consider
racist, religiously bigoted, or sexist statements that create an offensive
work environment, an offensive educational environment, or an of-
fensive public accommodations environment. May such statements be
freely restricted because they aren't speech but rather the "conduct"
of harassment?
I See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381-82 (1968) (upholding a restriction
on willful mutilation of Selective Service certificates because the restriction was "limited to
the noncommunicative aspect of O'Brien's conduct").
1278 [Vol. 90:1277
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There are at least three main types of such "it's conduct, not
speech" arguments. First, some people think speech should be
treated as conduct when it has the same effects as harmful conduct
and it is covered by a generally applicable law that restricts all conduct
that has those effects. This can happen in many situations:
(a) Publishing a book that describes how to grow marijuana
might constitute intentional or knowing aiding and abet-
ting of a crime.2
(b) Publishing a newspaper article or web site that points to an
infringing site may constitute contributory copyright in-
fringement.3
(c) Publishing a news story that reveals the name of a witness,
and thus unintentionally helps a criminal intimidate or kill
that witness, may violate laws that bar knowingly, recklessly,
or negligently facilitating crimes. 4
(d) Publishing a news story that reveals the existence of a wire-
tap may help the wiretap targets escape justice, and may
thus violate obstruction ofjustice laws. 5
(e) Teaching one's child racist, pro-polygamy, or pro- or anti-
homosexuality views may (in the views of some family court
judges) be contrary to the best interests of the child and
may therefore lead the parent to lose custody or have his
visitation rights curtailed under the generally applicable
"best interests of the child" standard, 6
2 See infra note 31 (discussing laws under which such liability could be imposed).
-1 Contributory copyright infringement is generally defined as behavior that materi-
ally contributes to third parties' copyright infringement, done with knowledge or reason to
know that the behavior will contribute to that infringement. See, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v.
Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996). Contributory infringement literally
covers the publication of pointers to infringing web sites, as some cases and a statute have
recognized. See Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STANt. L. REv. 1095, 1100 n.24
(2005). The cases involved clickable links, but including the URL of an infringing site in
plain text would also fit the contributory infringement definition. See id.
4 See, for example, N.Y. Penal Law § 115.00 (McKinney's 2004):
A person is guilty of criminal facilitation . .. when, believing it probable
that he is rendering aid... to a person who intends to commit a crime, he
engages in conduct which provides such person with means or opportunity
for the commission thereof and which in fact aids such person to commit a
'felony.
See also Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 3, at 1174 n.296 (citing other such stat-
utes); id. at 1098 n.18 (citing cases in which such publications have led to civil liability,
though under the speech-specific invasion of privacy tort rather than under a speech-neu-
tral crime facilitation theory).
5 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (Supp. II 2002) (outlawing "corruptly . . . im-
ped[ing] ... an official proceeding"); Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 3, at 1100
n.30 (citing authorities that treat helping a person escape as obstruction of justice).
6 See, e.g., Vilakazi v. Maxie, Mass. Probate Ct. No. 479549 (Aug. 7, 1975) (changing
custody largely based on the mother's racist views), affd, 357 N.E.2d 763 (Mass. 1976);
J.L.P.(H.) v. DJ., 643 S.W.2d 865, 871-72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (affirming custody limita-
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(f) Making statements that create an offensive work, education-
al, public accommodation, or housing environment based
on race, religion, sex, age, disability, or sexual orientation
might violate antidiscrimination law.7
(g) Speaking out against a proposed group home for the men-
tally disabled might violate the Federal Housing Act's ban
on "interfer[ing] with any person in the exercise or enjoy-
ment of' the right to be free from housing discrimination
based on handicap.8
(h) Engaging in speech that helps the election of an antiwar
candidate may violate treason law-which prohibits inten-
tionally aiding the enemy in time of war-if the speaker
thinks the enemy deserves to win the war.9
(i) Creating newspaper advertisements, billboards, or leaflets
that praise jury nullification may be punishable under laws
that prohibit all attempts to influence jurors.10
tions based on the father's pro-homosexuality views); Shepp v. Shepp, 821 A.2d 635,
637-39 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (denying the father custody of his daughter because of his
pro-polygamy views); cf In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 563 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (reversing
a trial court decision ordering a parent not to teach her child religious anti-homosexuality
views-the order was entered because the other parent was homosexual-but leaving open
the possibility that the order may be reentered if the trial court finds that "the child's
emotional development [would be] significantly impaired" by the parent's anti-homosexu-
ality speech); see generally Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech
Restrictions (draft manuscript, on file with author) (discussing the First Amendment impli-
cations of courts' use of the best interests of the child standard by family courts to restrict
parents' speech).
7 See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Cyberspace, Harassment Law, and the
Clinton Administration, 63 L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 299 (2000) (describing hostile environ-
ment harassment law, and giving examples of its application to otherwise protected
speech).
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2000); White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1230 (9th Cir. 2000)
(concluding that the Act, which primarily covers nonspeech activity, might be read as cov-
ering, for instance, "persuasive editorial[s] on a zoning dispute," but holding that such a
reading should be rejected because it "would quickly run afoul of the First Amendment").
9 See 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2000) (defining treason as including a citizen's "adher[ing]
to [the United States'] enemies, giving them aid and comfort"); Kawakita v. United States,
343 U.S. 717, 736, 742-44 (1952) (holding that "adhering" simply requires an intent to
help the enemy).
10 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-154 (West 2001) ("A person is guilty of tam-
pering with ajuror if he influences anyjuror in relation to any official proceeding ....");
FLA. S-rAT. ANN. § 918.12 (West 2001) ("Any person who influences the judgment or dcci-
sion of any grand or pett juror . .. with intent to obstruct the administration of justice,
shall be guilty of a felony . .."); State v. Springer-Ertl, 610 N.W.2d 768, 777 (S.D. 2000)
(holding that people could be punished for posting material urging jurors to acquit a
particular defendant, but only if the speech were "designed to influence specifically jurors
and persons summoned or drawn as jurors," as opposed to speech "intend[ed] to inform
the public or express a public opinion, regardless of whether jurors-drawn, summoned,
or sworn-may be among the public"); id. at 778 (SabersJ, dissenting) (concluding that a
statute banning communication intended to influence jurors' decisions was a "content-
neutral statute ... narrowly tailored to prevent criminal behavior" and was "unrelated to
the suppression of free expression").
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(j) Producing and distributing movies that stimulate copycat
crimes may constitute negligence under generally applica-
ble tort principles."
(k) Giving children sexually-themed material, or for that matter
political material that most people view as evil, may violate
laws that ban "impair [ing] the '.. . morals of... [a] child."12
In all these cases, the speech would be restricted because of what
it communicates-because its content informs, persuades, or offends
people-and because of the harms that flow from this informing, per-
suasion, or offense. Yet some courts and commentators argue that
such speech restrictions don't implicate the First Amendment because
the law in these instances punishes conduct, not speech: "[S]peech
which, in its effect, is tantamount to legitimately proscribable nonex-
pressive conduct may itself be legitimately proscribed, punished, or
regulated incidentally to the constitutional enforcement of generally
applicable statutes. '13  Others argue that generally applicable laws
11 See, e.g., Olivia N. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (hold-
ing, based on the First Amendment, that the media couldn't be held liable for crimes that
copy those that the media depicted); Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d
1067 (Mass. 1989) (same); cf fn re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig., 25 F.
Supp. 2d 837, 842 (N.D. Il. 1998) (imposing negligence liability on the National Hemo-
philia Foundation for its false statements about the safety of the blood supply, partly be-
cause of "the well-established principle that the protections of the First Amendment do not
shield the press from laws of general applicability").
12 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-21 (a) (1) (West 2001). People plausibly view
various types of speech as potentially impairing children's morals. See, e.g., NASsAu
CouNry, N.Y., LocAL LAW 11-1992 (2005) (banning the sale of trading cards depicting
criminals to children under age seventeen, on the theory that such cards impair the "ethi-
cal and moral development of our youth"); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641-42
(1968) (discussing a similar justification for restrictions on sexually-themed material); cf
Council Directive 89/552, art. 22, 1989 O.J. (L 298) 29 ("Member States shall take appro-
priate measures to ensure that television broadcasts by broadcasters under their jurisdic-
tion do not include any programmes which might seriously impair the physical, mental or
moral development of minors, in particular those that involve pornography or gratuitous
violence."). Speech-specific restrictions on speech to minors would of course trigger First
Amendment scrutiny. The question posed by the hypothetical in the text is whether the
government could avoid constitutional scrutiny by prosecuting such speech under a gener-
ally applicable law banning "impair[ing] the . . . the morals of ... [a child]."
13 Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997); see id. at 242-43
(arguing that publishing a book with the intent to help readers commit crime is punisha-
ble under generally applicable "criminal aiding and abetting" law); Robinson v. Jackson-
ville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1535 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (concluding that
"[pornographic] pictures and verbal harassment are not protected speech because they act
as discriminatory conduct in the form of a hostile work environment"); Doe v. Univ. of
Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 862 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (dictum) (distinguishing "pure speech"
from "sexually abusive and harassing conduct" such as workplace harassment); Aguilar v.
Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 854 (Cal. 1999) (plurality opinion) (defending the
injunction of speech under hostile environment harassment law partly because "[a] statute
that is otherwise valid, and is not aimed at protected expression, does not conflict with the
First Amendment simply because the statute can be violated by the use of spoken words or
other expressive activity"); Dep't of Corrs. v. State Pers. Bd., 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34, 53 (Cal.
2005] 1281
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should be treated as content-neutral restrictions on expressive con-
duct, and should thus be fairly easily upheld under the deferential
O'Brien test 14 because the restrictions on speech are "incidental" to the
law's overall thrust.15
A second type of "conduct, not speech" argument is sometimes
made even to defend laws that specifically target communication, such
as statutes that ban the publication of bombmaking information.
Such speech, the argument runs, is punishable because it is part of an
illegal "course of conduct," or is perhaps "speech brigaded with ac-
Ct. App. 1997) (Sims, J., dissenting) (concluding that an employee created an "abusive
work environment" by berating a coworker for supposedly being hired because of affirma-
tive action, and that such statements were "constitutionally unprotected conduct-unlaw-
ful discrimination-rather than protected expression"); Trayling v. Bd. of Fire and Police
Comm'rs, 652 N.E.2d 386, 395 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (defending government employers'
sexual harassment rules partly on the grounds that "[p]rohibitions against sexual harass-
ment are generally applicable laws"); Burns v. City of Detroit, 660 N.W.2d 85, 94 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2003) (concluding that hostile environment harassment law is constitutional because
the state antidiscrimination statute "is essentially directed toward discriminatory conduct,
and oral remarks such as those at issue here are 'swept up incidentally within the reach of a
statute directed at conduct rather than speech'" (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 389 (1992))); Susan W. Brenner, Complicit Publication: When Should the Dissemina-
tion of Ideas and Data Be Criminalized, 13 ALa. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 273, 377-78, 392 (2003)
(generally endorsing "[t]he 'speech act' approach[, which] criminalizes speech because it
is the act by which one either violates an independent criminal prohibition"-seemingly
referring to prohibitions that say nothing about speech-"or facilitates the violation of
such a prohibition"); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REv. 767,
768 (2001) ("[A] person who breaks a law not directed at speech can claim no constitu-
tional immunity just because he was acting for expressive reasons."). Some commentators
have also interpreted R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377 (1992), as taking this view, but I believe that that
interpretation is incorrect. See infra note 74.
14 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968).
15 See Schutz v. Schutz, 581 So. 2d 1290, 1292 (Fla. 1991) (upholding an injunction
ordering a mother to say things "necessary to restore and promote the frequent and con-
tinuing positive interaction (e.g., visitation, phone calls, letters) between the children and
their father and to refrain from doing or saying anything likely to defeat that end," on the
grounds that "any burden on the mother's first amendment rights" was simply "incidental"
to protecting the best interests of the child, and should therefore be reviewed under
O'Brien); Borra v. Borra, 756 A.2d 647, 651 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) (taking a similar
view); Laurel S. Banks, Note, Schutz v. Schutz, 31 U. LoUISVILLE J. FA. L. 105, 115-16
(1992-1993) (approving of the Schutz court's analysis); Elena Kagan, When a Speech Code Is a
Speech Code: The Stanford Policy and the Theory of Incidental Restraints, 29 U.C. DAvis L. REv.
957, 965 & n.24, 968-69 (1996) [hereinafter Kagan, When a Speech Code Is a Speech Code]
(suggesting that policies banning "harassment" in universities, presumably referring to hos-
tile environment harassment, should be reviewed only under O'Brien, even when such poli-
cies apply to otherwise fully protected speech); Rodney A. Smolla, Rethinking First
Amendment Assumptions About Racist and Sexist Speech, 47 WAsH. & LEE L. Riv. 171, 187
(1990) (defending the application of hostile environment law to restrict offensive work-
place speech because "[ t ] he gravamen of the tortious activity in [certain] cases.., is argua-
bly the proscription of underlying nonspeech conduct such as... anti-social behavior in
the workplace," and the "penalty exacted on speech in such cases appears incidental to the
governmental purpose"). But see In re Marriage of Olson, 850 P.2d 527, 532 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1993) (treating restrictions such as those in Schutz as content-based and therefore
unconstitutional); David L. Ferguson, Comment, Schutz v. Schutz: More than a Mere "Inci-
dental" Burden on First Amendment Rights, 16 NovA L. Rav. 937, 951 (1992) (same).
[Vol. 90:12771282
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tion,'' 6 a "speech act" rather than pure speech.' 7 The argument
seems especially appealing to some when the speech appears likely to
cause harms that would be punishable if caused by conduct rather
than speech-when "words are bullets," in the sense of being "a spe-
cific tool or weapon used . . .for the express purpose" of causing
harm. 8 Such arguments often quote Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice
Co., 9 a 1949 case which asserted that "[i] t rarely has been suggested
that the constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its im-
munity to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in
violation of a valid criminal statute,"20 and that "it has never been
deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a
course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initi-
ated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken,
written, or printed. '2 1
Courts have applied Giboney to justify, among other things, restric-
tions on (1) speech that advocates crime, (2) speech that explains
how crimes can be committed, (3) doctors' speech recommending
medicinal marijuana to their patients, (4) speech that urges political
boycotts, (5) speech that creates an offensive work environment, (6)
racially offensive business names, and even (7) public profanity.2 2
A third "speech as conduct" argument is made in Professor Kent
Greenawalt's influential book, Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language,23
which asserts that certain kinds of speech-such as offers, agreements,
orders, permissions, and some threats-constitute "situation-altering
16 Rice, 128 F.3d at 244 (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969)
(Douglas, J., concurring)). The Rice court treated "speech brigaded with action," id., as
equivalent to "speech which, in its effect, is tantamount to legitimately proscribable nonex-
pressive conduct." Id at 243.
17 For example, a U.S. Department of Justice report notes that:
[T]he constitutional analysis is quite different where the government pun-
ishes speech that is an integral part of a transaction involving conduct the
government otherwise is empowered to prohibit; such "speech acts" . . . may
be proscribed without much, if any, concern about the First Amendment,
since it is merely incidental that such "conduct" takes the form of speech.
1997 REPORT ON THE AvAiLABILITY OF BOMBMAEING INFORMATION, avaitabe at http://
www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/bombmakinginfo.html (last updated Mar. 22, 1999).
18 Cf LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:390 (West 2004) (supporting a ban on Communist
propaganda by arguing that "'(w]ords are bullets' and the communists know it and use
them so," and that "[t]he danger of communist propaganda lies ... in the fact that it is a
specific tool or weapon used by the communists for the express purpose of bringing about
the forcible total destruction or subjugation of this state and nation").
19 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
20 Id. at 498.
21 Id. at 498-502. This Article does not deal with situations in which speech is used
only as evidence of nonspeech conduct (for instance, when the government prosecutes a
defendant for homicide, and the government uses some of the defendant's statements to
show his motive). See infra Part II.B.2.
22 See infra notes 163-76.
23 KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE UsEs OF LANGUAGE (1989).
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utterances" and should therefore be treated as unprotected con-
duct.2 4 Finally, the "speech as conduct" argument is sometimes made
to explain some of the uncharted zones of First Amendment law: cate-
gories of speech whose First Amendment status the Court has never
squarely confronted, such as aiding and abetting, criminal solicitation,
conspiracy, perjury, agreements to restrain trade, and professional ad-
vice to clients.2 5 Most lawyers would likely agree that such speech gen-
erally should be unprotected, or at least less protected. A common
explanation for the Court's lack of attention to these speech restric-
tions is that the speech is actually conduct, which the First Amend-
ment does not protect.
This Article argues that these "it's not speech, it's conduct" doc-
trines are misguided. Such doctrines, if followed, would require
courts to focus on the wrong questions, and would often lead courts,
for instance in many of the above examples, to reach the wrong re-
sults. Part I argues that generally applicable laws can't be upheld sim-
ply because they're facially content-neutral, or even facially speech-
neutral. Rather, when a generally applicable law is content-based as
applied-when speech triggers the law because of the harms that may
flow from what the speech says-the law should be subject to full-
fledged First Amendment scrutiny. Under a generally applicable law
that bans interfering with the draft, for example, one who blocks the
entrance to a draft office may be punished; but it should be unconsti-
tional to punish someone who publishes a book that persuades people
to resist the draft, even though the book also interferes with the draft.
Speech and conduct-or more precisely the speech and non-
speech elements of some behavior-should indeed be distinguished,
and the nonspeech elements may be much more heavily regulated.
The distinction, however, should be the one suggested by United States
v. O'Brien and the other cases that distinguish content-neutral from
content-based speech restrictions: Expression can generally be regu-
lated to prevent harms that flow from its noncommunicative elements
(noise, traffic obstruction, and the like), but not harms that flow from
what the expression expresses. 26 Neither generally applicable laws
nor specially targeted laws should be allowed to restrict speech be-
cause of what the speech says, unless the speech falls within one of the
exceptions to protection (e.g., threats or false statements of fact) or
unless the restriction passes strict scrutiny.
This analysis also cuts against some commentators' arguments
that First Amendment doctrine should focus primarily on smoking
24 Id. at 57; see infra Part III.
25 See infra Part IV.
26 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968).
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out the legislature's impermissible, speech-restrictive motivations. 27
When a law generally applies to a wide range of conduct, and sweeps
in speech together with such conduct, there is little reason to think
that lawmakers had any motivation with regard to speech, much less
an impermissible one. Nonetheless, such a law should still be uncon-
stitutional when applied to speech based on its content-even though
the legislature's motivations may have been quite benign.2 8
Part II argues that the Giboney doctrine-whether framed as ap-
plying to "speech acts," to speech "brigaded with action," or to speech
that carries out an illegal "course of conduct" 29-is indeterminate,
dangerous, and inconsistent with more recent cases. Giboney and its
progeny don't explain which speech should be punishable and which
should not. The Giboney doctrine has been used to support the pun-
ishment of speech that, under current law, is rightly protected. And
even when the Giboney argument has been used to support restricting
speech that should indeed be restrictable, the argument still hasn't
adequately explained where the First Amendment boundaries should
be drawn.
Part III makes two observations about the "situation-altering ut-
terances" argument. First, the category that Professor Greenawalt pro-
poses is narrower than its name might suggest. Many utterances that
can be said to alter the situation-including the speech in nearly all
the above examples-remain presumptively protected speech even
under his analysis. The "situation-altering utterances" argument is by
its own terms inapplicable in those cases.
Second, the key insight underlying the argument-that utter-
ances lose their protection when they alter the speaker's, listener's, or
third party's perceived moral obligations-is not quite persuasive. As
I'll argue in Part 1l.B, it's not clear why such an effect should change
the First Amendment status of speech; there are many examples of
speech that alters people's felt moral obligations, but that nonetheless
seems to be pure speech rather than conduct. Speech, Crime, and the
Uses of Language is right to conclude that agreements, offers, and other
categories of speech should be unprotected, but the reason for this
doesn't seem to be simply that such statements are "situation-
altering."
All this, though, leaves unsolved several First Amendment puz-
zles. Just why are criminal agreements, criminal solicitation, and most
verbal aiding and abetting punishable, even when they are accom-
27 See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996) [hereinafter Kagan, Private Speech,
Public Purpose]; Rubenfeld, supra note 13.
28 See discussion infra Part I.E.1.
29 See infra note 159-62 and accompanying text.
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plished solely through words? Why may some speech be restricted
under antitrust law or securities law? Part IV argues that these puzzles
should be solved the same way the Court has answered why incite-
ment, libel, fraud, threats, and other speech are punishable: by recog-
nizing that these speech restrictions are indeed speech restrictions,
and by delineating the proper constitutional boundaries of these
restrictions.
Such delineation requires a considerable amount of work, and
this Article only outlines this task. But embracing this task is better-
and more likely to produce the right results-than avoiding it by sim-
ply labeling speech "conduct," with no explanation of why certain
forms of communication are protected and certain others are not.
I
LAWS OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY
A. Content-Based as Applied vs. Content-Neutral as Applied
Consider a generally applicable law that is being applied to
speech, but that on its face doesn't mention speech. Sometimes, as in
United States v. O'Brien, the law may be triggered by the "noncommuni-
cative impact of [the speech], and [by] nothing else."30 A law barring
noise louder than ninety decibels, for instance, might apply to the use
of bullhorns in a demonstration. We might call such a generally appli-
cable law "content-neutral as applied," because it applies to speech
without regard to its content.
But sometimes the law is triggered by what the speech communi-
cates. The law may, for instance, prohibit any conduct that is likely to
have a certain effect, and the effect may sometimes be caused by the
content of speech. A person may violate a law prohibiting aiding and
abetting crime, for example, by publishing a book that describes how
a crime can be easily committed.31 We might call such a law "content-
30 See, e.g., O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382 (holding that a generally applicable law banning
destruction of draft cards should be judged under a relatively forgiving First Amendment
standard, rather than strict scrutiny, because it applied to the defendant "[flor [the]
noncommunicative impact of his conduct, and for nothing else"); see also Melville B. Nim-
mer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REv. 29, 38, 45
(1973) (distinguishing laws that restrict speech because of a government "non-speech in-
terest," which turns on the noncommunicative impact of the speech, from laws that restrict
expression because of a government "anti-speech interest," which turns on the harms
"caused by the meaning effect of the speech"). Many commentators have argued that the
lawmakers who enacted the relevant parts of the law in O'Brien actually did intend to sup-
press a certain kind of expression; but the Court declined to inquire into the lawmakers'
intentions and instead focused on the fact that the law was triggered by the physical act of
destroying the draft card rather than by the act's communicative impact. See O'Brien, 391
U.S. at 383.
31 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 3541-2-4 (Michie 2004) ("A person who knowingly or
intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that
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based as applied," because the content of the speech triggers its appli-
cation. The law doesn't merely have the effect of restricting some
speech more than other speech-most content-neutral laws do that.
2
Rather, the law applies to speech precisely because of the harms that
supposedly flow from the content of the speech: Publishing and dis-
tributing the book violates the aiding and abetting law because of
what the book says.
The rest of this Part argues that laws that are content-based as
applied should be presumptively unconstitutional, just as facially con-
tent-based laws are presumptively unconstitutional. Both presump-
tions may sometimes be rebutted, for instance if the speech falls
within an exception to protection33 or if the speech restriction passes
strict scrutiny.34 But generally speaking, when a law punishes speech
because its content may cause harmful effects, that law should be
treated as content-based.
B. The Supreme Court Cases
It turns out that the Court has confronted many cases where a law
was content-based as applied. In all those cases, either the Court held
that the speech was constitutionally protected, or-if it held other-
wise-the decision is now viewed as obsolete.
Consider, for instance, the World War I-era cases Debs v. United
States,3 5 Frohwerk v. United States,36 and Schenck v. United States.37 These
cases, which upheld the criminal punishment of antiwar speech,3 8 are
now generally seen as wrongly decided.39 But the defendants' state-
ments had violated a generally applicable provision of the Espionage
Act, which barred all conduct-speech or not-that "willfully ob-
offense .... ."); Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 242-43 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding
that publishing a book that intentionally explains how to commit a crime may constitute
aiding and abetting of that crime); U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supra note 17, at text accompany-
ing notes 55-60 (taking the same view as Rice regarding aiding and abetting); Volokh,
Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 3, at 1096-97.
32 For instance, my sense is that bans on residential picketing in the late 1980s proba-
bly disproportionately affected speech criticizing abortion providers, since the pro-life
movement seems to have used residential picketing more than many other political move-
ments. See Leslie Gielowiacobs, Is There an Obligation to Listen?, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
489, 536 n.274 (1999).
33 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992).
34 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scru-
tiny, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2417, 2418-24 (1996) (discussing strict scrutiny doctrine).
35 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
36 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
37 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
38 See Debs, 249 U.S. at 212; Frohwerk 249 U.S. at 204; Scheck, 249 U.S. at 48-49.
39 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 966
(2d ed. 2002); Steven G. Gey, The Nuremberg Files and the First Amendment Value of Threats, 78
TEX. L. REv. 541, 569 (2000); Michael Vitiello, The Nuremberg Files: Testing the Outer Limits of
the First Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1175, 1218-19 (2000).
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struct[ed] the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, to
the injury of the service or the United States."40
The Espionage Act could have been constitutionally applied to
burning a recruiting office (nonspeech conduct), or perhaps to dis-
rupting the business of a recruiting office by using bullhorns outside
the office windows (speech punished because of its noncommunica-
tive impact) .41 But under modem First Amendment law, courts would
overturn convictions for antiwar leafleting or speeches, and would
treat the law as content-based, 42 because it is the content of such anti-
war speech that causes the interference with the draft.43
More broadly, if generally applicable laws were immune from
First Amendment scrutiny, the government could suppress a great
deal of speech that is currently constitutionally protected, including
advocacy of illegal conduct, praise of illegal conduct, and even advo-
cacy of legal conduct. For instance, a generally applicable ban on "as-
sisting, directly or indirectly, conspiracies to overthrow the
government" could prohibit advocacy of overthrow as well as physical
40 Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219; see also Gara v. United States,
178 F.2d 38, 39-41 (6th Cir. 1949) (upholding a conviction for "knowingly counsel[ing],
aid[ing], or abet[ting]" draft evasion, partly on the grounds that "violation of [the law],
particularly as to aiding and abetting, might be consummated without any expression of
opinion," and that the First Amendment provides no protection just because "the acts of
violation are consummated, as counseling always must be, through the medium of words"),
affld by an equally divided Court, 340 U.S. 857 (1950).
Debs and Frohwerk involved prosecutions solely under the generally applicable provi-
sion of the Espionage Act. SeeDebs, 249 U.S. at 212; Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 204. Schenck was
also convicted on two counts of unlawfully mailing certain material; those counts did not
involve generally applicable provisions. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52-53. Most critics of the
Schenck decision are likely at least as concerned about the generally applicable Espionage
Act, which had the effect of outlawing antidraft speech generally, as about the provisions
that were limited to distributing antidraft speech through the mail.
41 Cf Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-88 (1949) (plurality opinion) (holding that
the government may restrict sound amplification to some extent); id. at 89, 97 (Frank-
furter, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing on this point); id. (Jackson,J., concurring
in the judgment) (same); L.A. Powe, Jr., Searching for the False Shout of "Fire", 19 CONST.
COMMENT. 345, 347 (2002) (concluding that Justice Holmes reached the result in Schenck
precisely because he saw it as involving a generally applicable law rather than a speech
restriction: "The distinction between an attempt by conduct and an attempt by speech was,
for Holmes, a distinction without a difference").
42 See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,465 (1980) (citing Schenck as an example of a
case that involved a content-based distinction); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745
(1978) (plurality opinion) (same).
43 See Vincent Blasi, Six Conservatives in Search of the First Amendment: The Revealing Case
of Nude Dancing, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 611, 645-46 (1992) (noting that many of the cases
cited above involved generally applicable laws, but arguing that the speech should none-
theless have been protected against those laws); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and
the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 189, 198-99 (1983) (characterizing the law in
Schenck as a "content-based restriction" that "prohibited expression critical of the war and
the draft," though the portion of the Act that broadly prohibited such expression-as op-
posed to merely false information about the war-was generally applicable to conduct that
obstructed the draft as well as to speech that obstructed the draft).
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conduct such as making bombs: Advocacy of overthrow assists such
overthrow by persuading people to join, or at least not oppose, the
revolutionary movement. A ban on "assisting interference with the
provision of abortion services" could ban speech that praises or de-
fends anti-abortion blockaders or vandals, and notjust actual blockad-
ing or vandalism.
A ban on "conduct that knowingly or recklessly aids the enemy in
time of war" could, among other things, ban speech that helps the
election of an antiwar candidate. 44  Such speech could even be
banned by the existing law of treason-which bars intentionally aiding
the enemy during wartime-if a prosecutor could persuade the jury
that the speaker was motivated by a desire to help the other side.45 A
ban on "conduct that interferes with the enforcement of judicial de-
crees" may be applied to speech that criticizes judges or judicial ac-
tions, on the theory that such criticism may lead people to lose respect
for courts and thus to disobey court orders.
46
All the speech in these examples may help bring about the harms
that the generally applicable law is trying to prevent. It may even in-
volve "words that may have all the effect of force," an example that
Schenck gave as quintessentially unprotected speech (citing Gompers v.
Buck's Stove & Range Co., which used this reasoning to uphold an in-
junction against newspaper articles urging a labor boycott) .47 The
speech may thus have an effect that would be eminently punishable if
the effect were brought about by force rather than communication.
But the premise of the retreat from Schenck, and of the adoption of
44 See Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny,
supra note 34, at 2425-31 (discussing this hypothetical); cf Letter from Abraham Lincoln
to Erastus Corning and Others (June 12, 1863), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND WRIT-
INGS, 1859-1865, at 459 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989) (arguing that such antiwar
speech may be punishable, though focusing more on the speech as advocacy of desertion
rather than treason as such); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOP1.E'S DARLING
PRIVILEGE" 300-18 (2000) (discussing Lincoln's argument); Michael Kent Curtis, Lincoln,
Vallandigham, and Anti-War Speech in the Civil War, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 105, 121-31,
161 (1998) (same).
45 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
46 See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 395 (1962) (striking down a contempt of court
citation in such a case); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 349-50 (1946) (same);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 272-73 (1941) (same). These cases involved the com-
mon-law crime of contempt of court, under which contempt was sometimes defined quite
generally as "disregard of the authority of the court" (a definition that would cover a wide
variety of conduct, such as violation of a court order, as well as speech), and sometimes
more specifically as covering a long list of behavior including "[d] issemination of contenip-
tuous publications." See EDWARD M. DANGEL, NATIONAL LAWYERS' MANUAL-CONTEMPI § 2
(1939). But as the example in the text shows, the same results could have been reached
under a generally applicable contempt rule. See Brenner, supra note 13, at 321-22 (treat-
ing criminal contempt of court as a generally applicable law, though acknowledging that
"when criminal contempt is based on the communicative content of speech, it is an at-
tempt to control speech that implicates the guarantees of the First Amendment").
47 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (citing 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911)).
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the Brandenburg v. Ohio rule, 48 is that the government must generally
tolerate such advocacy even when the persuasiveness or the informa-
tional content of the speech can lead to eventual harm.49
Similarly, consider NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 5 0 where the
Court held that speech constituting tortious interference with busi-
ness relations may nonetheless be constitutionally protected. Tortious
interference with business relations covers a variety of conduct, not
just speech. 51 But when the interference flows from the persuasive or
informative effect of speech-for instance, when the speech in Clai-
borne Hardware persuaded people to boycott a business, publicized the
names of people who weren't complying with the boycott, or per-
suaded others to ostracize people who refused to join the boycott-
courts treat the tort as a speech restriction. 52
In some situations, the tort may be a constitutionally permissible
restriction, for instance when the speech is a constitutionally unpro-
tected threat, incitement, or the like.5 3 But if the speech falls outside
one of these exceptions to protection, then the First Amendment pro-
tects the speech against the generally applicable tort-so long as the
speech triggers the tort through its content-and not just against
facially content-based laws. 54
The same is true, in considerable measure, for antitrust laws and
other laws that prohibit restraint of trade. Like the interference with
business relations tort, laws that prohibit restraint of trade are gener-
48 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (holding that encouraging
the commission of crime is constitutionally protected except when the encouragement is
intended to and likely to cause imminent illegal conduct).
49 See LAURFNCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITTrrIONAL LAw 848 n.56 (2d ed. 1987)
("[H]owever a law is written, it may not constitutionally be applied to punish speech on
content-related grounds where nothing beyond abstract advocacy is shown, and where in-
citement is thus absent.").
50 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
51 See, e.g., Lucas v. Monroe County, 203 F.3d 964, 969, 979 (6th Cir. 2000) (allowing a
cause of action based on the discriminatory refusal by a county government to deal with a
contractor); H.J., Inc. v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 867 F.2d 1531, 1548 (8th Cir. 1989) (hold-
ing that selling a product below cost in order to monopolize a market constituted tortious
interference); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS §§ 766B cmt. b, 767 cmt. c (citing Tarleton
v. McGawley, 170 Eng. Rep. 153 (K.B. 1793), a case imposing liability for physically attack-
ing trading partners, as the ancestor of this tort).
52 See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 909-10.
5-9 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988); Claiborne, 458 U.S. at
927-28. One may criticize Claiborne on the grounds that some of the speech in that case
was indeed threatening, especially against the backdrop of violence related to the boycott.
But the Court concluded that the speech was neither an unprotected threat nor unpro-
tected incitement, and given this, the Court's further holding-that presumptively pro-
tected speech couldn't be the subject of an interference with business relations tort-
seems correct.
54 See, e.g., Hustler, 485 U.S. at 56 ("[P]ublic officials may not recover for the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress ... without showing in addition that the publi-
cation contains a false statement of fact which was made with 'actual malice . '").
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ally applicable and are used to punish conduct, not speech. But when
organizations help restrain trade by lobbying legislatures and the pub-
lic for anticompetitive regulations, Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference
v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc.55 and United Mine Workers v. Pennington
56
make clear that the speech may not be punished. 57
This principle also applies when the speech causes harm because
of its offensive content rather than its persuasive or informative con-
tent. Consider Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,5 18 which held that the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress couldn't be used to impose
liability on Hustler for publishing a cruel and vulgar satire of Jerry
Falwell. 59 Though claims under the emotional distress tort are often
based on speech, speech is not an element of the tort.6 0 The pub-
lisher of Hustler, for instance, would have been equally guilty of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress if he had played a highly
embarrassing practical joke on Falwell. 6 1 But when the general law
was applied to the magazine because of the content of its speech, the
Court held such liability to be unconstitutional.6 "2
55 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
56 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
57 Noerrand Pennington reached speech-protective results by interpreting the Sherman
Act as not applying to anticompetitive lobbying or public advocacy, but it's clear that the
Court was influenced by a desire to avoid a First Amendment violation. See, e.g., FTC v.
Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 424 (1990) (noting the Noerr Court's interpre-
tation of the Sherman Act "in light of the First Amendment[ ]"); Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137-38
("[Sluch a construction of the Sherman Act would raise important constitutional ques-
tions .... [W]e cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these
freedoms."); see also David McGowan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Immunity: State Action and
Federalism, Petitioning and the First Amendment, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'V 293, 363-66
(1994) (arguing that Noerr-Pennington immunity makes sense only as a First Amendment
exception to antitrust law, and not as a faithful interpretation of antitrust law standing
alone). These cases involved civil lawsuits, but surely speech should be at least as protected
against criminal punishments as it is against civil suits.
58 Hustler, 485 U.S. at 57.
59 Id.
60 See id. at 56; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
61 Consider the illustration from the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
A is invited to a swimming party at an exclusive resort. B gives her a bathing
suit which he knows will dissolve in water. It does dissolve while she is swim-
ming, leaving her naked in the presence of men and women whom she has
just met. A suffers extreme embarrassment, shame, and humiliation. B is
subject to liability to A for her emotional distress.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d, illus. 3 (1965).
62 See Hustler, 485 U.S. at 57. The Hustler decision relied on the fact that the speech
involved matters of public concern and a public figure; the Court might yet recognize a
free speech exception for intentional infliction of emotional distress where private figures
or statements on matters of private concern are involved. But if that happens, it would
happen because the speech is seen as harmful and not valuable enough to protect, not
because the tort is a law of general applicability (since the tort's general applicability wasn't
enough to save it in Hustler).
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The same is true of Cohen v. California,6 3 in which Cohen had
been prosecuted for violating a generally applicable breach of the
peace statute. 64 The statute would have applied equally to conduct
(fighting), speech that breaches the peace because of its noncom-
municative impact (loud speech in the middle of the night), and
speech that breaches the peace because of its content (wearing a
"Fuck the Draft"jacket). But the Court struck down the application of
the law in this last situation, precisely because the law's application to
Cohen was triggered by Cohen's speech.
65
Likewise, Hess v. Indiana,66 Edwards v. South Carolina,6 7 Terminiello
v. City of Chicago,6 8 and Cantwell v. Connecticut69 all set aside breach of
the peace and disorderly conduct convictions, though the statutes in-
volved were content-based only as applied, not on their face. As the
Court pointed out in Cantwell, "breach of the peace" legitimately "em-
braces a great variety of conduct destroying or menacing public order
and tranquility," including "violent acts"; but the Court set aside the
conviction because the speech constituted breach of the peace only
because of "the effect of [the speaker's] communication upon his
hearers. "70
63 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
64 Id. at 16 n.1 (involving a statute that, in relevant part, barred people from "mali-
ciously and willfully disturb [ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person.., by
tumultuous or offensive conduct").
65 See id. at 25-26.
66 414 U.S. 105, 105 n.1 (1973) (involving a statute that barred people from "act[ing]
in a loud, boisterous or disorderly manner so as to disturb the peace and quiet of any
neighborhood or family, by loud or unusual noise, or by tumultuous or offensive behavior,
threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight or fighting").
67 372 U.S. 229, 234-37 (1963) (involving a statute that barred "disturbance of the
public tranquility[ I] by any act or conduct inciting to violence," but concluding that speech
that disturbs the public tranquility is constitutionally protected even if it is covered by a
breach of the peace statute, because "the opinions which [the speakers] were peaceably
expressing were sufficiently opposed to the views of the majority of the community to at-
tract a crowd and necessitate police protection").
68 337 U.S. 1, 2 n.1, 3 (1949) (involving a Chicago city ordinance that barred people
from "making any improper noise, riot, disturbance, breach of the peace, or diversion
tending to a breach of the peace"; the trial court had defined "breach of the peace" in a
jury instruction as "'misbehavior which violates the public peace and decorum... [or] stirs
the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a distur-
bance, or . . . molests the inhabitants in the enjoyment of peace and quiet by arousing
alarm"').
69 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940) ("The offense known as breach of the peace embraces a
great variety of conduct destroying or menacing public order and tranquility. It includes
not only violent acts but acts and words likely to produce violence in others.").
70 See id. at 308-09; seealsoFeinerv. NewYork, 340 U.S. 315, 318 n.1 (1951) (involving
a statute that defined "the offense of disorderly conduct" to cover "[using] offensive, disor-
derly, threatening, abusive or insulting language, conduct or behavior," "[acting] in such a
manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct, or be offensive to others," or "[con-
gregating] with others on a public street and refus[ing] to move on when ordered by the
police," "with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace
may be occasioned"). The Court upheld the conviction in Feiner, but only on the grounds
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All the laws in these examples were facially speech-neutral. Most,
and probably all, were enacted by legislatures or created by courts
without any censorious motive, partly because their creators were try-
ing to punish and prevent harm, not speech as such. Yet these cases-
or, as to the Espionage Act cases, the modern repudiation of those
cases7 1 -treat the application of these laws based on the content of
speech just as skeptically as the Court has treated facially content-
based restrictions. 72 Likewise, later decisions treat Cantwell, Cohen, Ed-
wards, and Terminiello as involving content-based speech restrictions. 73
I will argue below that the Court has indeed been right to con-
demn restrictions that are content-based as applied. But for now,
these cases should at least show that any broad First Amendment im-
munity for generally applicable laws would be incompatible with many
leading precedents. 74 The laws described in the Introduction should
that the speech was unprotected by the First Amendment because it posed a "clear and
present danger of ... immediate threat to public safety." Id. at 320.
71 See supra note 39.
72 See Blasi,, supra note 43, at 645-46 (noting this point); David Bogen, Generally Appli-
cable Laws and the First Amendment, 26 Sw. U. L. REv. 201, 221-23 (1997) (distinguishing
generally applicable laws that are applied to speech for reasons unrelated to its content
from generally applicable laws that are applied to speech precisely because of its content).
73 United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) ("Where the
designed benefit of a content-based speech restriction is to shield the sensibilities of listen-
ers, the general rule is that the right of expression prevails, even where no less restrictive
alternative exists. We are expected to protect our own sensibilities 'simply by averting
[our] eyes.' Cohen v. California."); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("The
First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech, see, e.g.,
Cantwell v. Connecticut, ... because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. Content-based
regulations are presumptively invalid."); Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S.
123, 134-35 (1992) ("Listeners' reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for regula-
tion .... Speech cannot be financially burdened, any more than it can be punished or
banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob. See . .. Terminiello v. Chicago.");
Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("But, above all else, the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content. Cohen v. California ... ; Terminiello v. Chicago
. .. "); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) ("It is firmly settled that under our
Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the
ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers. See, e.g., . . . Edwards v. South
Carolina; Terminiello v. City of Chicago; cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut.").
74 A few courts and commentators have cited RA. V. v. City of St. Paul for the proposi-
tion that there is no First Amendment problem when speech is subjected, based on its
content, to generally applicable laws. See, e.g., supra note 13 and accompanying text (citing
Burns v. City of Detroit, the Aguilar v. Avis plurality, and the Dept of Corrections v. State Person-
nelBd. dissent, which all rely on R.A.V.). But R.A.V. dealt only with whether the govern-
ment may discriminate based on content among speech that falls within the existing First
Amendment exceptions, such as fighting words. The Court said only that "a particular con-
tent-based subcategory of a proscribabe class of speech can be swept up incidentally within the
reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech," P.A V, 505 U.S. at 389 (empha-
sis added), and its logic is indeed limited to restrictions on speech that fits within one of
the exceptions. See Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 207-09 (3d Cir. 2001)
(discussing this point); Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harass-
ment, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1791, 1829-32 (1992).
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be treated as involving content-based speech restrictions. They
shouldn't evade serious First Amendment scrutiny on the grounds
that they are generally applicable.
C. The Press Cases
So far, I've used the term "generally applicable law" simply to
mean a law applicable equally to a wide variety of conduct, whether
speech or not. But "generally applicable law" can have several differ-
ent meanings, depending on context:
(1) a facially speech-neutral law, which is to say a law applicable
to a wide variety of conduct, whether speech or not;
(2) a facially religion-neutral law, which is to say a law applicable
equally to religious observers and to others; or
(3) a facially press-neutral law, which is to say a law applicable
equally to the press and to others.
These three meanings-facially speech-neutral, facially religion-neu-
tral, and facially press-neutral-are different, though they sometimes
share the label "generally applicable law." For instance, most libel law
principles are press-neutral but not speech-neutral. A tax on all books
would be religion-neutral but not press-neutral.
Unfortunately, since all these laws are sometimes called "gener-
ally applicable," the three types may be confused with one another.
One major argument against the position I defend in the previous
section flows from this very sort of confusion. That argument cites
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,75 and the opinions on which that case relies,
for the proposition that applying generally applicable laws to speech
doesn't violate the First Amendment. 76
In Cowles Media, the Court held that "generally applicable laws do
not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement
against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and re-
port the news," and cited several other cases that so held. 77 But this
only means that the press gets no special exemption from press-neu-
tral laws. The Court didn't consider whether speakers were entitled to
protection from speech-neutral laws, especially when those laws are
content-based as applied.
Cowles Media involved a promissory estoppel lawsuit by a source
against a newspaper publisher. Cowles breached its promise not to
reveal Cohen's name; Cohen sued and won on a promissory estoppel
theory, and the Court held that the damages award didn't violate the
75 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
76 See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997); U.S. DEP'T
OFJUSTICE, supra note 17, at n.56; Bogen, supra note 72, at 227.
77 See Cowles Media, 501 U.S. at 669.
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First Amendment.78 In the process, the Court reasoned that the case
was controlled by the
well-established line of decisions holding that generally applicable
laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their en-
forcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to
gather and report the news. As the cases relied on by respondents
recognize, the truthful information sought to be published must
have been lawfully acquired. The press may not with impunity
break and enter an office or dwelling to gather news. Neither does
the First Amendment relieve a newspaper reporter of the obligation
shared by all citizens to respond to a grand jury subpoena and an-
swer questions relevant to a criminal investigation, even though the
reporter might be required to reveal a confidential source. The
press, like others interested in publishing, may not publish copy-
righted material without obeying the copyright laws. Similarly, the
media must obey the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair La-
bor Standards Act; may not restrain trade in violation of the anti-
trust laws; and must pay nondiscriminatory taxes. It is therefore
beyond dispute that "Itihe publisher of a newspaper has no special
immunity from the application of general laws. He has no special
privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others." Accordingly,
enforcement of such general laws against the press is not subject to
stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against
other persons or organizations.
There can be little doubt that the Minnesota doctrine of prom-
issory estoppel is a law of general applicability. It does not target or
single out the press. Rather, insofar as we are advised, the doctrine
is generally applicable to the daily transactions of all the citizens of
Minnesota. The First Amendment does not forbid its application to
the press. 79
The Court repeatedly stressed that it was discussing only whether
the press gets special exemption from laws that are equally applicable to
the press and to others, this quote mentions "the press, newspapers," or
"the media" nine times. Each of the examples the Court gave dis-
cussed what "the press," "the media," "newspaper[s] ," and "newspaper
reporter[s]" have no special right to do. This makes sense, because
the Court was overruling the Minnesota Supreme Court's conclusion
that the First Amendment requires courts to "balance the constitu-
tional rights of a free press against the common law interest in protect-
ing a promise of anonymity."8 0
Moreover, two of the Court's examples are consistent only with
the interpretation that the Court used "generally applicable" to mean
78 Id. at 665-66.
79 id. at 669-70 (internal citations omitted).
80 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 205 (Minn. 1990) (emphasis added),
rev'd, 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
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press-neutral rather than speech-neutral. First, copyright law (which
the Court also mentions as an example later in the opinion 5 ) is press-
neutral but not speech-neutral. In 1977, when Zacchini v. Scripps-How-
ard Broadcasting Co.82-the case that the Cowles Media Court cited
when referring to copyright law 83-was decided, copyright law applied
exclusively to communication, as it had through most of its history.
Even today it applies mostly to communication, though over the past
few decades it has been extended to cover architectural works and
computer program object code.8 4
Second, as Part JI.B pointed out, the First Amendment sometimes
provides a defense against antitrust law, when the alleged restraint of
trade comes from defendant's speech advocating legislation. Citizen
Publishing Co. v. United States85 and Associated Press v. United States,8 6 the
two antitrust cases that the Court cited,8 7 hold that newspapers cannot
raise their status as members of the press as a defense to antitrust law.
But Noerr and Pennington make clear that speakers can raise as a de-
fense the fact that the law is being applied to them because of their
speech.88
So the Cowles Media Court's "general applicability" reasoning
means simply that Minnesota promissory estoppel law is press-neutral,
and thus shouldn't have been subject to any heightened scrutiny sim-
ply because it was applied to the press.8 9 That, of course, leaves un-
81 See Cowles Media, 501 U.S. at 671 ("The dissenting opinions suggest that the press
should not be subject to any law, including copyright law for example, which in any fashion
or to any degree limits or restricts the press' right to report truthful information. The First
Amendment does not grant the press such limitless protection.").
82 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
83 See Cowles Media, 501 U.S. at 669.
84 See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, § 4, Pub. L. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853 (1988) (amending Copyright Act to cover architectural works); Act of Dec. 12, 1980,
§ 10, Pub. L. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 17)
(amending Copyright Act to mention computer programs). In its 1997 Report on Availa-
bility of Bombinaking Information, the U.S. Department of Justice argued that Cowles Me-
dia and Zacchini stand for the proposition "that generally applicable common-law causes of
action typically will not offend the First Amendment in cases where they are applied to
expressive conduct such as publication or broadcast," unless "an element of that cause of
action inevitably (or almost always) depends on the communicative impact of speech or
expression." U.S. DEP'T OFJUsTICE, supra note 17, at n.56. This assertion, though, ignores
the fact that Zacchini itself involved the right of publicity, a tort that invariably involves
"expressive conduct such as publication or broadcast," see 433 U.S. 562, 562 (1977), and it
doesn't mention NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., in which a generally applicable com-
mon-law cause of action was seen as offending the First Amendment when applied to ex-
pressive conduct, see supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
85 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
86 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
87 Cowles Media, 501 U.S. at 669.
88 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
89 Compare Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC
[W]hile the enforcement of a generally applicable law may or may not be
subject to heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment .. .laws that
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resolved the argument that the law couldn't be applied because it
restricted speech; after all, it was Cowles Media's speech that consti-
tuted the potentially actionable breaking of a promise. 90
But later in the opinion, the Court explains why promissory es-
toppel law is indeed constitutionally applicable to all speakers,
whether press or not: "Minnesota law simply requires those making
promises to keep them. The parties themselves, as in this case, deter-
mine the scope of their legal obligations, and any restrictions which
may be placed on the publication of truthful information are self-im-
posed."91 So the Court rejected the free speech argument based on
the principle that free speech rights, like most other rights, are waiv-
able, rather than on an assertion that speech-neutral laws are per se
constitutional.9 2
D. The Religion Cases
A second argument in favor of the categorical constitutionality of
speech-neutral laws might operate by analogy to religion-neutral laws.
Employment Division v. Smith,"" the argument would go, has held that
generally applicable laws (in the "religion-neutral" sense) don't violate
the Free Exercise Clause;94 likewise, generally applicable laws (in the
"speech-neutral" sense) shouldn't be seen as violating the Free Speech
Clause. 95
single out the press ... for special treatment 'pose a particular danger of
abuse by the State,' . . . and so are always subject to at least some degree of
heightened First Amendment scrutiny.
512 U.S. 622, 640-41 (1944) (internal citations omitted).
90 See Cowles Media, 501 U.S. at 671.
91 Id.
92 This reasoning made it unnecessary for the majority to decide whether promissory
estoppel law was purely content-neutral or facially content-neutral but content-based as
applied, since the Court's argument that free speech rights may be waived would apply in
either event.
93 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
94 Id. at 879.
95 Many commentators have noted the similarity between Cohen v. Cowles Media and
Employment Division v. Smith, though without taking the next step to argue that all facially
speech-neutral restrictions-including ones that are content-based as applied-are per se
constitutional by analogy to Smith (a step that I have heard some people make in person,
though not in print). See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Disentangling Symmetries: Speech, Associa-
tion, Parenthood, 28 PEPP. L. REv. 641, 650-51 (2001); Kristian D. Whitten, The Economics of
Actual Malice: A Proposal for Legislative Change to the Rule of New York Times v. Sullivan, 32
CUMB. L. REV. 519, 570 (2001-2002). Smith does reason that "generally applicable laws
unconcerned with regulating speech that have the effect of interfering with speech do not
thereby become subject to compelling-interest analysis under the First Amendment, see
Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139 (1969) (anti-trust laws)," and distin-
guishes such generally applicable laws from those "that make classifications based ... on
the content of speech," which are indeed subject to strict scrutiny. 494 U.S. at 886 n.3.
Likewise, Justice Scalia argued in Barnes v. Glen Theatres, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991), that
facially speech-neutral rules are per se constitutional, by analogy to Smith: "[I]f the law is
not directed against the protected value (religion or expression) the law must be obeyed."
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This analogy, I think, is weak. The Free Exercise Clause and the
Free Speech Clause protect different private interests, and courts have
long interpreted them differently. 96 The Free Exercise Clause, for in-
stance, doesn't generally entitle people to inflict emotional distress on
a public figure, interfere with business relations, engage in anticompe-
titive conduct, breach the peace, or interfere with the draft, even if
the people feel religiously compelled to do so. It probably wouldn't
have entitled people to do so even in the decades between Sherbert v.
Vernef'7 and Employment Division v. Smith,9 8 when the Free Exercise
Clause ostensibly provided religious objectors with some exemptions
from generally applicable laws. 99 The Free Speech Clause does let
one do these things, if they are done through the communicative ef-
fect of one's speech.
But to the extent that the Free Exercise Clause and the Free
Speech Clause are indeed analogous, the analogy cuts in favor of my
argument. With the Religion Clauses as well, some laws that are relig-
ion-neutral on their face may still be unconstitutionally religion-based
as applied. For instance, in intra-church disputes, generally applica-
ble, religion-neutral laws-such as contract law, property law, and wills
and trusts law-could usually be applied with no First Amendment
problems. If I leave property to a church so long as the church
doesn't use the property for manufacturing purposes, such a condi-
tion can be enforced. 0 0 But if applying the generally applicable testa-
mentary interpretation rules would require courts to make religious
judgments-for instance, if I leave property to a church so long as it
remains religiously orthodox and my heirs try to reclaim the property
on the grounds that the church has violated the condition-the Relig-
ion Clauses prohibit courts from acting.'0 1
Id. at 579 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). But these statements don't speak to
what would happen when the law is facially generally applicable but nonetheless "make[s]
classifications based on the content of speech" and is thus "directed against... expression"
as applied Neither Smith nor Barnes had occasion to consider this issue: The law involved in
Barnes was not just generally applicable but also content-neutral as applied (at least in
Justice Scalia's view, see id. at 574 n.2), as was the law in Citizen Publishing, likewise, the law
at issue in Smith was religion-neutral as applied.
96 See Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. Rv.
1465, 1498-1501 (1999).
97 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963).
98 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
99 See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 & n.23 (1971) (rejecting a claim
that the Free Exercise Clause mandates an exemption from the draft for those who oppose
a particular war on religious grounds).
100 SeeJones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-04 (1979) (concluding that civil courts may
decide church property disputes using "neutral principles" to interpret trust documents).
101 See id. at 604 (stressing that the "neutral principles" approach requires courts to
"scrutinize the document in purely secular terms, and not to rely on religious precepts in
determining" the document's meaning); Ark. Presbytery of the Cumberland Presbyterian
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Likewise, the law of fraud and false advertising is facially religion-
neutral and may often be applicable to churches' nonreligious claims.
But if the law, as applied to a claim, would require courts to evaluate
the truth or falsehood of a religious assertion, the Religion Clauses
would prohibit such an application.10 2
The same is likely true in other situations as well. If, for example,
you inflict emotional distress on a pro-choice politician by using loud-
speakers outside his house at 3 a.m., you will have no Free Speech
Clause defense. 10 3 Likewise, even if you feel religiously compelled to
remonstrate with the politician this way, you will likely have no Free
Exercise Clause defense either. 10 4
But if you inflict emotional distress on the politician using the
content of speech, for instance by publishing a vitriolic satire, that
speech is constitutionally protected under the Free Speech Clause. 10 5
Likewise, if a church inflicts emotional distress on the politician by
excommunicating him, the excommunication would be constitution-
ally protected under the Free Exercise Clause. 10 6 Even if the excom-
munication causes severe emotional distress-as it may, especially if
the politician or his family believes that it will damn him to hell-and
even if a jury finds that the excommunication was outrageous, the ex-
communication would remain constitutionally protected.
Thus, emotional distress that flows from the religiosity of the of-
fensive conduct, like emotional distress that flows from the content of
people's speech, may not form the basis of legal liability even under
the generally applicable emotional distress tort. Similarly, many child
custody cases have held that the facially religion-neutral "best interests
of the child" standard may sometimes violate the Free Exercise Clause.
Courts may not diminish the custody rights of a divorced parent be-
Church v. Hudson, 40 S.W.3d 301, 307 (Ark. 2001) ("Any documents, such as the church
constitution, pertinent to the dispute, must be scrutinized in purely secular terms.").
102 See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87-88 (1944).
103 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
104 See Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 652-53 (1981)
(holding-even during the Sherbert/ Yoder era, when strict scrutiny was generally applied to
religious exemption claims-that religious observers' rights to engage in religiously-moti-
vated speech are no greater than secular speakers' rights to engage in analogous secular
speech).
105 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
106 See, e.g., Marks v. Estate of Hartgerink, 528 N.W.2d 539, 544-45 (Iowa 1995) (refus-
ing to recognize a tort of wrongful excommunication); Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New En-
gland, Inc., 571 N.E.2d 340, 346 (Mass. 1991) (rejecting intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim where a church's teachings allegedly caused the harm: "Inherent in the claim
that exposure to ISKCON N.E.'s religious beliefs causes tortious emotional damage is the
notion that the disputed beliefs are fundamentally flawed .... While this issue may be the
subject of a theological or academic debate, it has no place in the courts of this Common-
wealth"); Korean Presbyterian Church v. Lee, 880 P.2d 565, 569-70 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994)
(refusing to recognize a tort of wrongful excommunication).
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cause of the supposed harmfulness of the religious doctrine that he is
teaching his children, unless the religious teaching is not just against
the child's "best interests" but is actually likely to cause the child sig-
nificant secular harm. 10 7
I don't want to claim too much of an analogy here. Though
some of the cases cited above rely on the Free Exercise Clause,1 08
others just talk about the First Amendment generally, 10 9 and the rea-
sons for some of these doctrines may have more to do with fear of
government entanglement with theological questions than with con-
cern about equal treatment as such.' 10 As I mentioned, there is no
reason to expect Free Speech Clause doctrine to track Religion
Clauses doctrine perfectly. Nonetheless, the Religion Clauses juris-
prudence generally illustrates the broader point: When constitutional
doctrine prohibits laws that facially turn on some factor-whether the
factor is the content of speech or religious judgments-the doctrine
should also bar courts from applying generally applicable laws in ways
that are based on that factor. 1
107 See, e.g., In reMarriage of Minix, 801 N.E.2d 1201, 1205 (111 App. Ct. 2003); Paterv.
Pater, 588 N.E.2d 794, 798 (Ohio 1992); Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1157 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1990); In re Marriage of Knighton, 723 S.W.2d 274, 282-83 (Tex. App. 1987); In
re Marriage of Jensen-Branch, 899 P.2d 803, 808 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). But see In re Short,
698 P.2d 1310, 1313 (Colo. 1985) (concluding that courts applying the "best interests of
the child" standard can take into consideration the parents' religious practices, though
acknowledging that even in those cases, "[c]ourts are precluded by the free exercise of
religion clause from weighing the comparative merits of the religious tenets of the various
faiths or basing its custody decisions solely on religious considerations"); Rogers v. Rogers,
490 So. 2d 1017, 1018-19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the court "may consider a
parent's religious beliefs or values as one of several factors aiding in its child custody deter-
mination"); LeDoux v. LeDoux, 452 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Neb. 1990) (concluding that"[t]he para-
mount consideration in all cases involving the custody or visitation of a child is the best
interests of the child," and that the parents' religious practices may be considered when
determining what is in the child's best interests).
108 See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 107-08 (1952) (holding that
interference with internal church affairs violates "the free exercise of religion"); see also
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.
440, 447-48 (1969) (citing Kedrofffor the same proposition); United States v. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944) (relying on the "freedom of religious belief').
109 .See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (relying on the First Amendment
generally rather than the Free Exercise Clause specifically); Zumnmo, 574 A.2d at 1138,
1157-58 (discussing both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause);
Knighton, 723 S.W.2d at 277-78 (same); see also Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1241
(Alaska 1979) (relying solely on the Establishment Clause); Waites v. Waites, 567 S.W.2d
326, 331 n.2 (Mo. 1978) (same).
1 10 See, e.g., Jones, 443 U.S. at 603; Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87.
111 We see something similar even in Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence. Gener-
ally applicable race-neutral laws are usually constitutional-but not when they are race-
based as applied. Consider Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), where the Court held
unconstitutional a child custody decision based on the mother's having remarried some-
one of another race: A best interests of the child standard is facially race-neutral, and
usually quite permissible, but when the harm to the child's interests is said to flow from the
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E. Free Speech and Constitutional Immunity for Persuasion,
Information, and Content-Based Offensiveness
1. The Limited Relevance of Good Government Motives
The cases discussed in Part I.B reflect a coherent principle: The
First Amendment generally makes conveying facts and opinions into a
constitutionally immunized activity. Normally, the government may
punish people for causing various harms, directly or indirectly. But it
generally may not punish speakers when the harms are caused by what
the speaker said-by the persuasive, informative, or offensive force of
the facts or opinions expressed.' 2
This is, of course, quite compatible with the Court's general juris-
prudence of content-based restrictions; it just equally covers laws that
are content-based as applied and laws that are content-based on their
face. And this principle makes sense, because a law that's content-
based as applied-such as the Espionage Act involved in Schenck' t3
and Debs 14-can restrict speech as much as a law that's content-based
on its face. Moreover, such a law is indeed punishing the "speech
element" of the communication rather than some "nonspeech
element."115
This principle is in some tension, however, with claims that the
First Amendment is chiefly aimed at preventing government actions
that are motivated by a desire to suppress speech.' 1 6 In the examples
set forth above, the lawmakers may have genuinely wanted to prevent
a certain kind of harm, and may have been quite indifferent to
parent's race, the Court recognizes that the application of the law involves race discrimina-
tion. See id. at 432.
112 Unless, of course, the speech falls within one of the First Amendment exceptions,
such as incitement, false statements of fact, threats, and the like.
113 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
114 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
115 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
116 See, e.g., Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose, supra note 27, at 414 ("First Amend-
ment law, as developed by the Supreme Court over the past several decades, has as its
primary, though unstated, object the discovery of improper governmental motives."); Ka-
gan, When a Speech Code Is a Speech Code, supra note 15, at 965 & n.24, 968-69 (applying this
approach to suggest that generally applicable policies banning hostile environment harass-
ment in universities should only be reviewed under O'Brien, even when they're applied to
otherwise fully protected speech); Rubenfeld, supra note 13, at 784 (arguing that the Free
Speech Clause is implicated "if and only if: (1) the law makes the fact that [a person] was
communicating an element of the prohibited offense; (2) the legislative purpose was to
target speech even though the prohibition is speech-neutral on its face; or (3) the law was
selectively enforced to target speech"). I say only "in some tension" because some of the
scholars who urge a focus on motive acknowledge that "[s]ome aspects of First Amend-
ment law resist explanation in terms of motive." Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose, supra
note 27, at 415. Since Professor Kagan's claim is only that "the concern with governmental
motive [is] ... the most important[ I explanatory factor in First Amendment law," id., and
"most important" is necessarily a subjective term, I leave it to the reader to decide whether
the cases discussed above substantially undermine that claim.
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whether that harm is caused by speech or by conduct. The drafters of
the Espionage Act, for instance, might have sincerely wanted to pun-
ish all interference with military recruitment. But whether the Act was
well-motivated or not, it should have generally been unconstitutional
when applied to interference by persuasion.
In some of the examples, one can argue that the law is open to
improper government motivations in its enforcement. For instance,
the "outrageousness" test in the emotional distress tort,'1 7 the "offen-
sive conduct" test in breach of the peace laws,"" and the "offensive
work environment" test in workplace harassment law' 1 9 are quite
vague. Prosecutors, judges, and juries might well interpret them nar-
rowly when they agree with the speech, and broadly when they disa-
gree with the speech.
But in other situations, the law is pretty clear. Public speech that
advocates draft resistance does seem likely to obstruct recruitment.
1 20
Ajournal article that explains how fingerprint recognition systems can
be evaded 12' does seem likely to facilitate certain crimes by some read-
ers. If applying the law to such speech would violate the First Amend-
ment, the reason must flow from something other than the
government's motive, which may well be quite pure. 22 So, if the cases
discussed in Part I.B are right, then the constitutional problem lies in
the law's being content-based as applied-in its punishing speech be-
cause of the persuasive effect of the speech-and not in the govern-
ment's being motivated by a desire to suppress speech rather than to
prevent harm.
Though the Supreme Court has at times said that "[i]n determin-
ing whether a regulation is content based or content neutral, we look
to the purpose behind the regulation,"'123 it has also acknowledged
117 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988).
118 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).
119 See Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Work Environment" Harassment Law Re-
strict?, 85 G~o. L.J. 627, 635-37 (1997).
120 See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 539-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (Hand, J.).
121 See, e.g., Ton van der Putte & Jeroen Keuning, Don't Get Your Fingers Burned, in
IFIPTC8/WG8.8 FOURTH WORKING CONFERENCE ON SMART CARD RESEARCH AND ADVANCED
APPLICATIONS 289, 294-99 (2000) (arguing that "none of the fingerprint scanners that are
currently available can distinguish between a finger and a well-created dummy" and
describing two methods to create dummies that will fool the scanners), available at http://
www.keunigh.comb/biometry/BiometricalFingerprintRecognition.pdf
122 Prosecutors may still have discretion in deciding whom to charge under those laws,
and they may exercise that discretion out of a desire to suppress certain viewpoints, rather
than to evenhandedly prevent the harm that the law is aimed at preventing. But that risk is
equally present for any law that may be applied to speech, including generally applicable
laws that are both speech-neutral on their face and content-neutral as applied.
123 Barmicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
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that "while a content-based purpose may be sufficient in certain cir-
cumstances to show that a regulation is content based, it is not neces-
sary to such a showing in all cases."' 2 4 The better formulation is the
one the Court has often used: A content-neutral law is one that is 'Jus-
tified without reference to the content of the regulated speech"' 25-
and a law that is content-based as applied is indeed justified, in that
application, with reference to what the speech communicates.1 2 6
2. Content-Based Applications vs. Content-Neutral Applications
a. The Problem
Courts, then, treat generally applicable laws that are content-
based as applied differently from ones that are content-neutral as ap-
plied. The Court probably would not, and should not, have inter-
vened if Hustler had inflicted emotional distress on Falwell by using
loud bullhorns outside Falwell's house. Nor would the Court have
found a First Amendment violation if the NAACP had been sued for
organizing a demonstration that blocked the entrance to Claiborne
Hardware's door, or if Schenck had been prosecuted for interfering
with the draft by blocking a draft board office.
But why? The law, and thus the lawmakers' motivation for enact-
ing the law, would be the same in these hypotheticals as in the real
cases. The law's effect would be the same: The law as applied would
restrict speech. What then is left to explain the difference? And if
indeed the lawmakers' motivation doesn't have the importance that
124 Id. at 526 n.9 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642-43
(1994)).
125 See id. at 526; Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 720 (2000); United States v. Playboy
Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317-18
(1990); Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; TRIBE, supra note 49, at 789-90; John Hart Ely, Flag Desecra-
tion: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88
HARv. L. REv. 1482, 1496-1502 (1975); see also Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amend-
ment, supra note 43, at 211-17 (taking a similar view, but limited to those restrictions where
the communicative impact consists of persuading, informing, or offending people).
126 In Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989), a prison speech case, the Court did
interpret a "content-neutrality" rule as focusing on the government's ultimate motive
rather than on whether the rule restricted speech based on its content. The Thornburgh
Court upheld a restriction on speech with certain content on the ground that the restric-
tion was "neutral," in the sense of being ultimately justified by an interest in prison secur-
ity, rather than by a dislike for certain viewpoints. See id. at 404-05 & n.5, 415-16
(upholding ban on information about weapons construction or alcohol production, en-
couragement of escape or other crimes, or "sexually explicit material" and especially
homosexually-themed material that "poses a threat to the security, good order, or disci-
pline of the institution"). If a similar rule were applied outside prisons, a wide range of
speech restrictions-for instance, bans on advocacy of violence, draft evasion, sexism, and
so on-would be treated as "content-neutral" simply because the government's ultimate
purpose would be to prevent harmful conduct. Fortunately, this approach seems to be
limited to restrictions on prisoner speech; Thornburgh itself stressed that it was applying an
unusual definition of neutrality. See id. at 415-16 (referring to "'the technical sense' in
which the Court used the term 'neutral' in [a prior case that discussed this test]").
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some assign to it, then what is the difference even between facially
content-based laws and facially content-neutral ones? There are, I
think, two main answers to these questions-a conceptual one and a
pragmatic one.
b. The Conceptual Distinction
Under nearly every theory of free speech, the right to free speech
is at its core the right to communicate-to persuade and to inform
people through the content of one's message. The right must also
generally include in considerable measure the right to offend people
through that content, since much speech that persuades some people
also offends others. 12 7
Persuading and informing people may certainly cause harm; the
listeners might be persuaded to do harmful things. But the premise of
modern First Amendment law is that the government generally may
not (with a few narrow exceptions) punish speech because of a fear,
even a justified fear, that people will make the wrong decisions based
on that speech: "[T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with
the responsibility forjudging and evaluating the relative merits of con-
flicting arguments .... [11f there be any danger that the people can-
not evaluate the information and arguments advanced by [speakers],
it is a danger contemplated by the Framers of the First Amend-
ment."1 28 Thus, punishing speech because its content persuades, in-
forms, or offends especially conflicts with the free speech guarantee,
more so than punishing speech for reasons unrelated to its potential
persuasive, informative, or offensive effect.
127 There might be some limits on this right to offend, for instance if (1) the speaker is
communicating to someone who has already said that he doesn't want to hear the message,
and (2) the speaker can stop speaking to this unwilling listener, while still continuing to try
to persuade or inform other potentially willing listeners. See, e.g., Rowan v. U.S. Post Office
Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (adopting this view as to unwanted mailings sent to peo-
ple's homes); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988) (adopting this view as to residen-
tial picketing, though in my view not so persuasively as in Rowan); Volokh, Freedom of Speech
and Workplace Harassment, supra note 74, at 1863-66 (suggesting such an approach as to
hostile environment harassment law).
128 First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 (1978); see aLso Linmark Assocs. v.
Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1977) (ruling that a Township Council ordi-
nance "restrict[ing] the free flow of ... data because [the Council] fears that otherwise
homeowners will make decisions inimical to what the Council views as the homeowners self
interest" is unconstitutional and "paternalistic"); Dale Carpenter, The Antipaternalism Princi-
ple in the First Amendment, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 579, 579-81 (2004) ("[I]n the law of free
speech .. .paternalism has been largely rejected."); Stone, Content Regulation and the First
Amendment, supra note 43, at 213-14 ("Government ordinarily may not restrict the expres-
sion of particular ideas, viewpoints, or items of information bccausc it does not trust its
citizens to make wise or desirable decisions if they are exposed to such expression.").
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c. Practical Effects
i. Content-Based Restrictions as Likely Greater Burdens on
Speech
I suspect that the Court's skepticism about content-based laws
(whether facially content-based or content-based as applied) flows in
large part from this conceptual distinction.1 29 But the conceptual ar-
gument is also reinforced by a pragmatic one: Allowing content-based
restrictions (whether facially content-based or content-based as ap-
plied) is likely to burden speech more than allowing content-neutral
restrictions. 13 0
To begin with, a typical law aimed at noncommunicative effects is
unlikely to excessively inhibit the communication of some viewpoint
or fact, because many different media would remain available to the
speakers. 1 3 For instance, even a total ban on leafleting, justified by
the desire to prevent litter, would still leave people free to communi-
cate their views by the many media that don't create litter-by display-
ing signs, using radio broadcasts, advertising in newspapers, and so
on.
I think the leafleting ban would indeed interfere with public de-
bate too much, but it can't even come close to driving certain views
entirely from public debate. Moreover, because the content-neutral
law can potentially apply to a wide range of speakers, its scope will
likely be limited by political forces.13 2 Thus, the most severe hypothet-
129 See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968) (distinguishing restric-
tions aimed at the "communicative" elements of expressive conduct from those aimed at its
"noncommunicative" elements); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94-96 (1972) (hold-
ing that the government generally may not "restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content").
130 I'll treat the term "content-based restrictions" as roughly interchangeable with the
phrase "restrictions triggered by the communicative effects of speech," and the term "con-
tent-neutral restrictions" as roughly interchangeable with the phrase "restrictions triggered
by the noncommunicative effects of speech." Some commentators have also argued that
content-based restrictions are more dangerous than content-neutral restrictions, because
content-based restrictions often distort public debate by burdening one side of a debate
while allowing another to be heard free of any such burden. See, e.g., Stone, Content Regula-
tion and the First Amendment, supra note 43, at 217-27. Others have disagreed. See, e.g.,
Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose, supra note 27, at 445-51. My analysis neither relies on
nor rejects the distortion argument-I focus on whether a restriction is likely to substan-
tially interfere (as opposed to only modestly interfere) with the expression of certain facts
or viewpoints.
131 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CMI. L. Ri-v. 46, 75 (1987)
("[Elven in such cases [where a content-neutral restriction has a strong content-differen-
tial effect], the harm that can flow from judicial miscalculation is limited. Content-neutral
restrictions usually limit the availability of only particular means of expression. They are
thus unlikely substantially to block the communication of particular messages.").
132 See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 336-37 (1988) (Brennan,J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) ("[TIhe best protection against governmental attempts to
squelch opposition ... [has been] the requirement that the government act through con-
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ical content-neutral restrictions-for instance, a ban on printing, justi-
fied by the environmental harms caused by the process of making
paper133-are sure to remain just hypotheticals: They are politically
implausible precisely because they burden so much speech.
On the other hand, a content-based restriction, whether facially
content-based or content-based as applied, can outlaw most expres-
sion of certain facts or opinions. If a law, such as the laws in Schenck v.
United States 34 or NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,' 3 5 bans any con-
duct that may cause a certain harm, and persuading people to act in
certain ways can cause that harm, then any viewpoints that have the
potential for such persuasion-the draft is evil, blacks should boycott
white-owned businesses-would largely be prohibited. Because the
law focuses either on the content of the speech or on the harm that
the speech causes, it can block the speech in all media. And because
it's limited to a narrow range of speech, it may face less political oppo-
sition than broader bans might provoke.' 3 6
Even narrower content-based restrictions, such as the laws in-
volved in Cohen v. Californial s 7 or Hustler Magazine v. Falwel,13 18 can be
quite burdensome. True, such restrictions only limit the particular
words (in Cohen) or the level of vitriol (in Hustler) a speaker can use,
and don't ban the expression of a particular fact or idea. But as Jus-
tice Harlan rightly concluded in Cohen, even such restrictions can seri-
ously interfere with people's ability to express the "otherwise
inexpressible emotions" that only certain kinds of words can effec-
tively capture.' 3 9 Harsh contempt for a policy (the draft) or a person
(Jerry Falwell) is itself a viewpoint that is subtly different from mild-
tent-neutral means that restrict expression the government favors as well as expression it
disfavors.").
13 See Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TEcH.
L.J. 713, 721-22 (2000) (suggesting as an example a law that bans newsprint to save trees);
see also Stone, Content-NeutralRestrictions, supranote 131, at 58 (discussing a hypothetical law
that would neutrally ban all speeches, leaflets, newspapers, magazines, and radio or televi-
sion broadcasts).
134 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
135 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
136 Of course, restrictions on popular conduct, or on conduct engaged in by a politi-
cally powerful minority, may indeed face serious political opposition. Conduct restrictions
in a democracy tend to ban only unpopular conduct, however, such as interference with
the war effort (as in Schenck), and with it equally unpopular speech. Such generally appli-
cable restrictions may therefore be fairly easy to enact, since they target only a relatively
small and unpopular group. Content-neutral restrictions on speech (such as leafleting or
picketing), on the other hand, would restrict many political groups from all over the politi-
cal spectrum. If such content-neutral restrictions are too burdensome, they would thus
likely arouse a wide range of opposition, which provides a natural political check on their
scope.
137 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
138 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
139 See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25-26.
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mannered condemnation, and prohibitions on harsh language seri-
ously interfere with the ability to convey this viewpoint.
ii. The Limits of the "Ample Alternative Channels" Inquiry,
Both as to Content-Neutral Restrictions and as to
Content-Based Restrictions
I have argued that content-based restrictions are dangerous be-
cause they risk broadly suppressing certain viewpoints or facts. But
one could respond that, instead of presumptively prohibiting content-
based speech restrictions, courts could try to prevent serious burdens
on speech the same way they do with content-neutral restrictions: by
asking whether the restrictions leave open "ample alternative chan-
nels" for expression. 40
I think, though, that the Court has been right to reject such pro-
posals and to treat content-based restrictions as presumptively uncon-
stitutional without an inquiry into how much the restriction burdens
speech or into whether the restriction leaves open ample alternative
channels. 41 To begin with, the record of the ample alternative chan-
nels inquiry in the content-neutral restriction test hasn't been very
good. The Court has at times applied it in a demanding manner, for
instance insisting that alternative channels aren't ample if they materi-
ally raise the price of speaking, make it harder for speakers to reach
the same listeners, or subtly influence the content of the message by
changing the medium. 142 But at other times, the Justices have treated
this requirement as only a weak constraint.' 4 3 Such a disparity is to be
expected given the vagueness of the term "ample."
140 See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56-57 (1994).
141 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 879-80 (1997); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, 507 U.S. 410, 430 (1993); Consol. Edison Co v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530, 535-38 (1980).
142 See, e.g. Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 56-57.
143 See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1986) (hold-
ing that a zoning law that banned adult theaters from 95% of the land in a city left open
ample alternative channels, though it apparently substantially increased the likely expense
of renting or buying space, and likely made the theaters less accessible); Members of the
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 & n.30 (1984) (holding that a ban
on posting leaflets on city-owned utility poles left open ample alternative channels, though
the alternatives were likely considerably more expensive); see also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532
U.S. 514, 544 (2001) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (articulating and applying the test for
content-neutral speech restrictions without even mentioning the ample alternative chan-
nels inquiry, in a case where the speech restriction probably left open very few realistic
channels for communicating the facts that the speaker wanted to communicate); Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1992) (articulating and applying the test for
content-neutral speech restrictions without mentioning the ample alternative channels in-
quiry); cf. JAMES WEINSTEIN, HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE RADICAL ATTACK ON FREE
SPEECH DOCTRINE 35, 39 (1999) (pointing out that content-neutral restrictions are nearly
always upheld); Robert C. Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249,
1262-63 (1995) (concluding that the ample alternative channels prong is "read as extraor-
dinarily lenient").
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In fact, the chief practical limit on content-neutral restrictions
has not been the "ample alternative channels" inquiry, but rather the
political reality mentioned above: Most realistically enactable restric-
tions on the noncommunicative aspects of speech do leave open fairly
substantial alternative channels for expressing the same ideas. So
even if the Court underenforces the ample alternative channels
prong, few views or subjects will likely be broadly silenced. 144
But it's much more likely that a politically feasible restriction on
the communicative aspects of speech will substantially block people
from expressing a particular viewpoint. This is true even when the
restriction is framed as facially content-neutral, or even as speech-neu-
tral-consider, for instance, the Espionage Act in Schenck.145 Judicial
underenforcement of the ample alternative channels prong for con-
tent-based restrictions would thus be much more dangerous than un-
derenforcement in the context of content-neutral restraints.
iii. The Limits of the "Ample Alternative Channels" Inquiry as
to Content-Based Restrictions
Judicial underenforcement of the ample alternative channels
prong would also be more likely when the case involves content-based
restrictions, whether they are facially content-based or content-based
as applied. "Ample" is a vague term, and one that requires contesta-
ble predictions about the law's effects on a complex system of speak-
ers and listeners. There is a large gray area in which the quality of the
alternative channels would be hard to estimate. And when the restric-
tion will likely cover only a particular message-pro-boycott speech,
anti-draft speech, and so on-the normal risk of judicial error and
deliberate or subconscious prejudice is magnified because the judges
know well which side of the political debate will lose as a result of their
decision. 146 In such a scenario, it's especially likely that judges will
apply the vague "ample alternative channels" standard in a way that's
not protective enough of unpopular speakers. It is probably no acci-
dent that the low water mark of the requirement, City of Renton v. Play-
time Theatres, Inc., 14 7 involved a restriction that was limited to sexually-
themed speech, even though the Court treated the restriction as con-
tent-neutral. 148
144 See Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, supra note 43, at 226; supra
note 131.
145 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
146 See WEINSTEIN, supra note 143, at 40 (noting the risk of deliberate or subconscious
judicial viewpoint discrimination); Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, supra
note 43, at 225 ("U]udicial evaluations of viewpoint-based restrictions are especially likely
to 'become involved with the ideological predispositions of those doing the evaluating.'"
(quotingJOHN HART ELY, DEMocRAcY AND DISTRUST 112 (1980))).
147 475 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1986).
148 Id. at 46-49.
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Moreover, one restriction aimed at the communicative impact of
certain speech is likely to be followed by other such restrictions. Con-
tent-based restrictions don't appear randomly: They arise because
some fairly powerful segment of society (in government or out of it)
believes that a certain kind of speech is dangerous, or-as to laws that
aren't facially content-based but are content-based as applied-be-
lieves that all conduct that's likely to cause certain effects is
dangerous.
If such a group succeeds in restricting, say, Communist speech in
some contexts, it seems likely that it will also want to restrict Commu-
nist speech in other contexts. Likewise, if a movement tries to restrict
bigoted speech in workplaces, perhaps using generally applicable hos-
tile work environment harassment law, it will also likely try to use simi-
lar educational and public accommodations harassment rules to
restrict speech in educational institutions or places of public accom-
modation.149 (That has in fact been the pattern of restrictions on
Communist advocacy, antiwar speech, sexually themed speech, pro-
civil-rights speech, and racist speech. 150 )
Each success will help validate the pro-restriction forces' positions
in the eyes of voters and legislators who are on the fence.i 5t Moreo-
ver, each success may reinforce the enthusiasm of the supporters of
the restrictions. 1 52 And government restrictions on such speech are
also likely to be accompanied by private restrictions on such speech,
for instance by private broadcasters, publishers, employers, and com-
mercial property owners. As a result, even when each restriction
standing alone imposes only a modest burden on speech, the aggre-
gate of all the restrictions can end up being quite burdensome.
It is, of course, possible for courts to consider this risk, to allow
only the first few restrictions, and then to strike down any new restric-
tions once the alternative channels no longer seem to be ample. But
that's a hard project for courts to engage in, especially when they are
armed only with the vague "ample alternative channels" standard.
149 See generally Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Cyberspace, Harassment Law, and the Clinton
Administration, supra note 7, at 303, 317-33 (noting this tendency).
150 See GEOFFRE R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES 311-426 (2004) (Communist speech); id. at
135-231 (antiwar speech); Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Cyberspace, Harassment Law, and the
Clinton Administration, supra note 7, at 303, 317-33 (sexually-themed and racist speech);
ANTHONY LEwis, MAKE No LAw: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AmENDMENT 35-36, 44
(1991) (pro-civil-rights speech).
1' l See Daniel A. Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68
GEO. LJ. 727, 737-38 (1980) (noting that content-based classifications may "stigmatiz[e]
the categories they single out for special treatment"); Eugene Volokh, Mechanisms of the
Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1077-1105 (2003) (describing such "attitude-altering
slippery slopes").
152 See Volokh, Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, supra note 151, at 1121-27 (describing
such "political momentum slippery slopes").
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Judges may find it hard to explain why they are treating two seemingly
similar restrictions differently, simply because of the order in which
the restrictions were enacted. And because "ample" lacks an objec-
tive, absolute definition, courts may end up applying a relative crite-
rion-how many channels the restriction leaves open compared to
those available before this restriction was enacted, or how many it
leaves open compared to those that it shuts down. If that is so, courts
might indeed allow a sequence of restrictions that gradually but sub-
stantially reduces the alternative channels, even if the courts would
have struck down a restriction that tried to impose the same burden
all at once. 55
d. Conclusion
For all these reasons, the Court has been right to treat restrictions
that are content-based as applied-even if they are facially generally
applicable to both speech and conduct-with the same skepticism as
it has used for restrictions that are content-based on their face. It's
the only approach that is consistent with Hustler, Claiborne Hardware,
and the other similar cases. It's properly hostile to the government's
attempts to restrict speech because of the informative or persuasive
power of the speech. And it's necessary to prevent the government
from having the power to broadly suppress certain facts and ideas.
When speech is punished precisely because of what it communi-
cates-for instance, because it may persuade people to violate the law
or to boycott someone, because it may offend some listeners, or be-
cause it may convey information that helps people commit crimes-
the law is operating as a content-based speech restriction. The law is
restricting speech precisely because of what is spoken. Therefore,
courts should subject such a law to serious First Amendment analysis;
153 See id. at 1105-14 (describing such "small change tolerance slippery slopes").
This tendency might also occur with restrictions aimed at the noncommunicative im-
pact of speech. A billboard ban, a home sign ban, or a leafleting ban, for instance, may be
part of a broader movement that values calm and esthetics above free speech. See Stone,
Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 131, at 74-75 (observing that government officials
"are usually deeply committed to the maintenance of order and the conservation of re-
sources," which may lead them to systematically support even content-neutral speech re-
strictions that seem to make public places calmer, or diminish the government's
administrative or police protection burdens). Such a movement may indeed end up yield-
ing a sequence of these sorts of restrictions.
Still, this seems considerably less likely than with restrictions aimed at the communica-
tive impact of speech. First, the movement will he more likely to run up against political
opposition from a range of speakers, possibly including some fairly popular ones. Second,
the restrictions are less likely to draw from the same base of support: For instance, many
people who hate billboards will likely not be as troubled by leaflets or signs on people's
homes, since the noncommunicative impact of these media is quite different. People who
want to suppress Communist or racist speech, on the other hand, are more likely to want to
suppress it in a wide range of media and locations.
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they ought not dodge this analysis by simply relabeling the speech as
"conduct."
II
SPEECH "BRIGADED WiTH ACTION," SPEECH AS AN ILLEGAL
"CouRSE OF CONDUCT," AND SPEECH AS A
"SPEECH ACT"
A. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.
"It rarely has been suggested," Justice Black wrote for the Court
in Giboney v. Empire Storage &Ice Co.154 in 1949, "that the constitutional
freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writ-
ing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal
statute." 155 "[I] t has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom
of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because
the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means
of language, either spoken, written, or printed.' ' t 56 Likewise, Justice
Blackjoined two opinions characterizing Giboney as stating that speech
may be punished when it's "brigaded with illegal action."'157 Others
have described the Giboney principle as authorizing speech restrictions
when the speech is tantamount to a "speech act[ ] ."58
Giboney used this reasoning to uphold an injunction against
peaceful picketers who were trying to pressure a business "to agree to
stop selling ice to nonunion peddlers." 159 Such an agreement, the
Court said, would have violated Missouri trade restraint law; therefore,
enjoining such picketing did not violate the First Amendment. 160 But
the Giboney argument has also been used tojustify many other kinds of
speech restrictions:
154 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
155 I& at 498.
156 Id. at 502.
157 See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 82 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting); cf Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring) (not joined by Justice Black on this
point).
158 See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 248 (4th Cir. 1997); U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, supra note 17, at text accompanying nn.55-60. Occasionally, as in the arguments
about crime-facilitating speech, the Giboney argument may overlap with the "generally ap-
plicable law" argument, but the Giboney argument is sometimes used even to defend laws
that explicitly restrict speech, such as laws prohibiting the solicitation of crime. See Rice,
128 F.3d at 243-44.
159 Giboney, 336 U.S. at 492.
160 Id. at 504.
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(a) The Justice Department' 6' and a court of appeals 6 2 have
recently reasoned that Giboney lets the government restrict
books that may inform people how to violate the law, at
least when the publisher intends that those books help peo-
ple commit crimes.
(b) Justice Goldberg's majority opinion in Cox v. Louisianat63
described Giboney as supporting the proposition that "[a]
man may be punished for encouraging the commission of a
crime."1 64 The Court cited as an example Fox v. Washing-
ton,' 65 a 1915 case that upheld the punishment of a newspa-
per editor who endorsed the propriety of nudism.1 66
161 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 17, at text accompanying nn.55-56. The
DOJ's Report noted:
[I]t is hard to imagine that the First Amendment would permit culpability
or liability for publication of other bombmaking manuals that have a pro-
pensity to be misused by some unknown, unidentified segment of the read-
ership, since sources of the same information inevitably will remain in the
public domain, readily available to persons who wish to manufacture and
use explosives .... On the other hand, the constitutional analysis is radi-
cally different where the publication or expression of information is "bri-
gaded with action," in the form of what are commonly called "speech acts."
If the speech in question is an integral part of a transaction involving con-
duct the government otherwise is empowered to prohibit, such "speech
acts" typically may be proscribed without much, if any, concern about the
First Amendment, since it is merely incidental that such "conduct" takes the
form of speech. "'[tlt has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom
of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the
conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of lan-
guage, either spoken, written, or printed.'" Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,
436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336
U.S. 490, 502 (1949)).
Id. Despite the opening sentence of the quotation, the Justice Department used this argu-
ment to defend the constitutionality of a ban on "publication of... bombmaking manuals
that have a propensity to be misused by some unknown, unidentified segment of the read-
ership," so long as the ban was limited to publishers who were "motivated by a desire to
facilitate the unlawful use of explosives." Id. at text accompanying nn.55 & 68.
162 See Rice, 128 F.3d at 243 (relying on Giboney in allowing liability for publishing a
book that described how to commit contract murders); see also United States v. Savoie, 594
F. Supp. 678, 682, 685-86 (W.D. La. 1984) (relying on Giboney in issuing an injunction
against, among other things, the distribution of any document explaining how taxpayers
could "avoid the payment of, or to obtain the refund of, federal income taxes ... based on
the false proposition that wages, salaries or other forms of compensation for labor or ser-
vices not specifically excluded from taxation under Title 26 of the United States Code are
not taxable income").
163 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
164 Id. at 563.
165 236 U.S. 273 (1915).
166 Id. at 273; see also State v. Musser, 175 P.2d 724, 731 (Utah 1946) (upholding crimi-
nal punishment for conspiracy to teach the propriety of polygamy, on the theory that
"[e]xpressions and the use of words may constitute verbal acts," and that therefore "an
agreement to advocate, teach, counsel, advise and urge other persons to practice polygamy
and unlawful cohabitation, is an agreement to commit acts injurious to public morals
within the scope of the conspiracy statute"), vacated and remanded, 333 U.S. 95 (1948);
Rubenfeld, supra note 13, at 827-28 (justifying Brandenburg on the grounds that incitement
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(c) Some courts have recently used Giboney to defend restric-
tions on doctors' recommending medicinal marijuana to
their patients. 6 7
(d) Courts have similarly used the "conduct not speech" argu-
ment to justify restricting speech that creates an offensive
work environment.168
(e) Judges have relied on Giboney to support restrictions on
speech that urges political boycotts aimed at pressuring gov-
ernments to change their policies. 169
(f) A state administrative agency has relied on Giboney tojustify
a restriction on racially offensive business names. 17 0
(g) The dissent in Cohen v. Californiat7  (joined by Justice
Black) cited Giboney to argue that wearing a jacket contain-
ing the phrase "Fuck the Draft" should be constitutionally
unprotected: "Cohen's absurd and immature antic . . . was
mainly conduct and little speech." 72
intended to and likely to cause imminent illegal conduct is "participat[ion] in[ I that
course of conduct").
167 SeePearson v. McCaffrey, 139 F. Supp. 2d 113, 121 (D.D.C. 2001); Conantv. McCaf-
frey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 698 (N.D. Cal. 1997); see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 20,
Walters v. Conant, 540 U.S. 946 (2003) (No. 03-40). But see Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d
629, 637-38 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding such speech constitutionally protected). These par-
ticular restrictions might be justifiable under a possible professional-client speech excep-
tion, see infra text accompanying notes 338-53, though I'm not sure that this is so.
168 SeeJarman v. City of Northlake, 950 F. Supp. 1375, 1379 (N.D. 111. 1997) (not citing
Giboney, but reasoning that "verbal acts of sexual harassment are not protected speech");
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1535 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (not
citing Giboney, but reasoning that "[pornographic] pictures and verbal harassment are not
protected speech because they act as discriminatory conduct in the form of a hostile work
environment"); see also Robert A. Sedler, The Unconstitutionality of Campus Bans on "Racist
Speech": The View from Without and Within, 53 U. Pr-r. L. Rav. 631, 673 n.159, 674 (1992)
(taking a similar view, at least with respect to speech by supervisors).
169 See Missouri v. Nat'l Org. for Women, 620 F.2d 1301, 1324 n.15 (8th Cir. 1980)
(Gibson, J., dissenting) (arguing, citing Giboney, that NOW's advocacy of a boycott of Mis-
souri businesses, aimed at getting Missouri to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment, might
be constitutionally punishable as an antitrust law violation); Searle v. Johnson, 646 P.2d
682, 685 (Utah 1982) (holding, citing Giboney, that the state Humane Society's advocacy of
a tourist boycott of a county, aimed at getting the county to improve its dog pound, could
be constitutionally punishable as interference with prospective business advantage).
170 In re Urban League v. Sambo's, No. 79 PRA 074-06/06, at 9 (R.I. Comm'n for Hum.
Rts. Mar. 16, 1981) (relying partly on Giboney to conclude that the name "Sambo's Restau-
rants" violated public accommodations laws because it was offensive to black customers).
But see Sambo's Restaurants, Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686, 694 (6th Cir. 1981)
(stating that use of the name was protected by the First Amendment even if it was offensive
to black customers); Sambo's of Ohio v. City Council of Toledo, 466 F. Supp. 177, 179
(N.D. Ohio 1979) (holding that it was unconstitutional for a city to deny sign permits to
Sambo's because of its name).
171 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
172 Id. at 27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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B. But What Exactly Does Giboney Mean?
These applications of Giboney may seem puzzling, and in many
respects inconsistent with recent First Amendment cases such as Co-
hen, Brandenburg, and Claiborne Hardware.17 3 This is so because the
logic of Giboney itself is puzzling, and inconsistent with the logic of the
more recent Supreme Court cases. In particular, none of the obvious
interpretations of Giboney's rather ambiguous language makes much
sense.
1. "Course of Conduct" Referring to the Noncommunicative Harms of
Speech
The modem Supreme Court case law has, of course, recognized a
sort of conduct/speech distinction. Speech or expressive conduct
may be restricted because of harms flowing from its noncommunica-
tive component (noise, obstruction of traffic, and the like)-which
one might view as its "conduct" element-but not because of harms
flowing from its communicative component, the "speech" element.174
This is the now-standard distinction that the Court introduced in
O'Brien and on which it has continued to rely. But this can't be the
distinction Giboney or the above cases that cite Giboney are using, since
173 Justice Blackmun's dissent in Cohen is of course inconsistent with the majority's
result. The approval in Cox of restrictions on speech that urges illegal conduct is inconsis-
tent with Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). The approval of restrictions on speech
urging boycotts is inconsistent with NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
174 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). Occasionally, courts indeed
cite Giboney as supporting this conduct/speech distinction, and there it poses little diffi-
culty. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965) (citing Giboney for the proposi-
tion that the law may bar "cordon[ing] off a street[] or entrance to a public or private
building," or might even nondiscriminatorily "forbid[ ] all access to streets and other pub-
lic facilities for parades and meetings," in order to prevent, for instance, interference with
traffic); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 325 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Giboney for
the proposition that private property owners may use trespass law to remove speakers from
their property).
The Court has also suggested that some conduct is so unlike the traditional media of
communication that it should be viewed as entirely outside the First Amendment, perhaps
even when it's being restricted for its communicative effects. See, e.g., O'Brien, 391 U.S. at
376 ("We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be
labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express
an idea."); see also Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (cit-
ing O'Brien, and stating that "[w]e assume for present purposes, but do not decide," that
overnight sleeping in a park to protest against homelessness may qualify as expressive con-
duct); WEINSTEIN, supra note 143, at 33 (taking a similar view). But see Cmty. for Creative
Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting
the view that "sleeping is or can ever be speech for First Amendment purposes," when the
restriction on sleeping is aimed at the noncommunicative impact of the conduct, but rea-
soning that a "law directed at the communicative nature of conduct" must still face First
Amendment scrutiny), rev'd sub noma. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288 (1984). This suggestion, though, wouldn't apply to the examples in this Part, which
involve traditional forms of expression (conversation, books, picketing, and the like).
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those cases involve speech that's restricted because of harms that flow
from its content.
2. Conduct Evidenced by Means of Language
Nor are the above cases simply relying on Giboney's assertion that
conduct can be punished even though it is "in part... evidenced...
by means of language. '175 Speech can indeed be used as evidence of
prohibited conduct, or of a punishable intent that accompanies pro-
hibited conduct. A person's expression of pro-Nazi opinions, for in-
stance, may be evidence that the reason he helped a Nazi saboteur was
to aid the Nazi cause.1 76 But in Giboney and the other cases discussed
above, the law punished the speech itself, not some other behavior of
which speech was simply the evidence.
3. Illegal Course of Conduct Meaning Speech that Itself Violates a
Law
One could try to explain the opinions that rely on Giboney by rea-
soning that the speech itself-picketing to achieve a certain result,
advocating nudism, wearing profanities on one's jacket, publishing a
book describing how to commit a crime-violates a law, and in that
sense becomes an "illegal" "course of conduct." Likewise, one article
suggests (though without citing Giboney) that "speech that amounts to
the commission of an independently illegal act," such as "bribery, per-
jury, and threats," is constitutionally unprotected because it "is prop-
erly treated as action, even if it consists solely of words."1 77
But the point of modern First Amendment law is that speech is
often protected even though it violates a law restricting it. Speech
that violates a latter-day Sedition Act,178 public profanity (as in Cohen
v. California79 ), and speech "encouraging the commission of a crime"
(as in Cox v. Louisiana18 0 ) would indeed be "illegal" "course [s] of con-
duct" under laws that prohibit such speech. Such laws, though, are
175 Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949).
176 SeeHaupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 641-42 (1947); see alsoWisconsin v. Mitch-
ell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993) (same as to racist opinions being used as evidence that the
defendant selected a victim because of the victim's race).
177 Cass R Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. Cm. L. REV. 795, 836-37, 839 (1993)
(theorizing that in such situations "[tjhe words do not cause the act[;] [tlhe words are the
act"). Professor Sunstein's argument may well rest on an implicit theory about which
words are unprotected because they are acts, and which words are protected even though they
are acts (for instance, the act of sedition or encouragement of crime). The portions of the
article that I quote, however, unfortunately do not make such a theory explicit.
178 1 Stat. 596 (1798); Sedition Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 553 (1918), repealed by Act of
March 3, 1921, ch. 136, 41 Stat. 1359.
179 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
180 379 U.S. 436 (1965).
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nonetheless speech restrictions, and courts rightly evaluate them-
and often strike them down-under the First Amendment. 181
Perjury is no less speech, and no more action, than was speech in
violation of the Sedition Act, which sought to punish another form of
falsehood. Perjury is speech in a particular context, such as in court
or on an official form, but it is still communication that is punished
because of what it communicates. Perjury and threats should be pun-
ishable, but only because they fall within an exception to free speech
protection and not because they are somehow not speech.182
4. Illegal Course of Conduct Meaning Speech That Violates a
Generally Applicable Law
Some, though not all, of the cases that cite Giboney might be ex-
plained on the grounds that the speech violates a generally applicable
law that bans a wide range of conduct including speech.1 83 Such an
argument, though, would reduce the Giboney principle to the princi-
ple described and criticized in Part I.
5. Conduct Referring to a Broader Course of Illegal Behavior by the
Speaker
"[C]ourse of conduct" "in part initiated .. .or carried out by
means of language" 184 might be read as referring to some course of
behavior that consists of both speech and other illegal behavior (or
planned illegal behavior) by the speaker. For example, if I'm plan-
ning to kill someone at a particular place, and I lure the victim by
telling him to meet me there, then I might well be guilty of attempted
murder, even though my behavior partly consists of communica-
181 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that encouraging the
commission of crime is not punishable except when the encouragement is intended to and
likely to cause imminent illegal conduct); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
288-92 (1964) (holding that seditious libel is not punishable); id. at 269 (condemning
attempts to restrict speech that rely simply on "epithets" or "labels" such as "insurrection,
contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal
business, and the various other formulae for the repression of expression"). Professor Sun-
stein takes the view that advocacy of crime-even including punishable incitement-is
speech rather than "action," but doesn't explain how a criminally punishable threat (ac-
tion, in the article's view) and criminally punishable incitement (not action) would differ
in this respect. See Sunstein, supra note 177, at 837.
182 For perjury, the exception would be the one for knowingly false statements of fact.
See N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 291-92 (stating that such statements are generally unprotected,
unless they are seditious libel against the government); see also Illinois ex rel. Madigan v.
Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600, 620-21 (2003) (holding the same as to statements
that are fraudulent but not defamatory); infra quote accompanying note 297 (stressing that
perjury laws are speech restrictions). Bribery might indeed involve action-the transfer of
money-as well as speech, or might be punishable on the grounds that it involves a prom-
ise, which may be properly restrictable. See infra text accompanying notes 321-27.
183 See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997).
184 Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949).
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tion. 18 5 This example, however, wouldn't fit the facts of Giboney,
where the defendants were simply speaking. Nor would it fit any of
the other cases described above, where the speakers were likewise sim-
ply communicating, and not engaging in any nonspeech conduct.
6. Conduct Referring to a Broader Course of Illegal Behavior by
People Other Than the Speaker
One might read "course of conduct" "in part initiated.., or car-
ried out by means of language"1 86 as referring to the aggregate of the
speaker's speech and the conduct of people whom the speech might
affect. If the course of conduct includes illegality, the theory would
go, then the speech part of the course of conduct would be just as
illegal as the action that the speech brings about. This might fit the
facts of Giboney--in which the speaker was trying to pressure the em-
ployer into acting illegally-and of some of the lower court cases that
cite Giboney.
But such a reading would be inconsistent with Brandenburg, and
with the modern repudiation of cases such as Schenck and Debs.'8 7
Schenck's18 and Debs' speech,18 9 for instance, would be protected
today under the Brandenburg test, °9 0 though both speakers were con-
victed for trying to produce some illegal nonspeech behavior-the
crime of draft evasion-on the part of others. Brandenburg shows that
speech is protected even when it tries to trigger illegal behavior by
listeners, except for the unusual situations in which the speech is in-
tended to and likely to produce imminent lawless conduct.' 9' So if
Giboney ever meant that speech may be restricted when it can indi-
rectly bring about illegal conduct, the Court has overruled that princi-
ple in Brandenburg.
7. Conduct Carried Out by Means of Language Referring to Threat
of Action
One could interpret Giboney as standing for the rather narrow
proposition that threats of conduct may be constitutionally unpro-
tected. In addition to advocating a boycott, and advocating that Em-
pire Storage & Ice stop dealing with nonunion ice peddlers, the
185 Cf. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 206 (1904) ("The most innocent and consti-
tutionally protected of acts or omissions may be made a step in a criminal plot, and if it is a
step in a plot neither its innocence nor the Constitution is sufficient to prevent the punish-
ment of the plot by law.").
186 Giboney, 336 U.S. at 502.
187 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
188 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 48-49 (1919).
189 See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919).
190 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
191 See id. at 447-49.
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picketers in Giboney made two sorts of threats: the threat of a boycott
(essentially, "Stop dealing with nonunion ice peddlers, or our friends
will stop dealing with you") and the threat that union members who
crossed the picket line would be ejected from their union.192
The Court seemed to rest its judgment partly on these threats.1 93
The Justices argued that "all of appellants' activities-their powerful
transportation combination, their patrolling, their formation of a
picket line warning union men not to cross at peril of their union
membership, their publicizing-constituted a single and integrated
course of conduct, which was in violation of Missouri's valid law."
1 94
In so doing, the Court reasoned that "appellants were doing more
than exercising a right of free speech or press" because "[t]hey were
exercising their economic power together with that of their allies."1 95
The Court's characterization of the appellant's conduct as "exercis-
ing.., economic power" might have been referring to threatening to
use one's economic power to pressure people into changing their
behavior. 196
Likewise, consider two early 1980s opinions citing Giboney. Searle
v. Johnson'9 7 held that the Humane Society's advocacy of a boycott of a
Utah county, aimed at getting the county to improve its dog pound,
was unprotected speech that was punishable under the interference
with business relations tort. 198 Similarly, a dissenting opinion in Mis-
soui v. NOW 99 seemingly would have held the same about NOW's
speech urging a boycott of Missouri, aimed at getting the state legisla-
ture to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment.20 0 Both of these opinions
might be understood as suggesting that because the urged boycotts
would have been illegal, threats of such boycotts are unprotected. 201
Nonetheless, a rule that threats of boycott are constitutionally un-
protected would probably be unsound today, given Claiborne Hard-
ware.20 2 Claiborne also involved a threat of boycott, and a threat of
ostracism (though social ostracism rather than ejection from a union)
of people who refused to comply with the boycott.2 03 Yet the Court
held the speech to be constitutionally protected, even without any in-
quiry into whether such boycotts and organized ostracism might have
192 Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1949).
193 See id.
194 Id. at 498.
195 Id. at 503.
196 See id.
197 646 P.2d 682 (Utah 1982).
198 Id. at 683.
199 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980).
200 Id. at 1324 n.15 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
201 See Searle, 646 P.2d at 686-89; Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d at 1321-25.
202 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
203 Id. at 926-27.
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themselves violated Mississippi law. This suggests that threats of a boy-
cott, or at least of a politically motivated boycott, are indeed constitu-
tionally protected speech. 20
4
Even if the true meaning of Giboney is focused on threats, and
survives Claiborne Hardware, the Giboney principle is far better captured
simply by saying that threats of certain kinds of retaliation-and espe-
cially threats of illegal retaliation-are constitutionally unprotected,
rather than by saying that speech is unprotected when it "carrie[s]
out" an illegal "course of conduct. '20 5 And most of the applications of
Giboney that I cited in the Introduction would then have to be re-
jected, because they have nothing to do with threats.2 0 6
8. Conduct Referring to Picketing
Finally, Giboney involved another form of conduct-picketing.
The Court described picketing as "more than free speech, since it in-
volves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a
picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespec-
tive of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated."
20 7
Peaceful picketing, it seems to me, should be treated no differ-
enfly than any other kind of behavior used to communicate a mes-
204 Claiborne distinguished Giboney on the grounds that Giboney involved "regulat[ion
of] economic activity," rather than "prohibit[ion of] peaceful political activity such as that
found in the boycott in [Claiborne]," id. at 913, but this strikes me as unsound. Giboney and
Claiborne both involved advocacy that was aimed at improving the position of a certain
social group (union members in Giboney and blacks in Claiborne), and that worked by threat
of economic activity (or inactivity), namely boycott of a certain business. See id. at 886;
Giboney, 336 U.S. at 491-92. Of course, the speech in Claiborne was also motivated by the
speakers' beliefs about morality and justice, and sought to appeal to listeners' beliefs about
morality and justice, but union speech aimed at benefiting workers is also motivated by
concerns about morality and justice as well as money. Certainly the labor movement has
been an ideological and political movement and not just an economic one. SeeJulius G.
German & F. Ray Marshall, The Continuing Assault on the Right to Strike, 79 TEX. L. Rav. 703,
719 n.97 (2001).
The one possible distinction is that the Giboney picketers were trying only to get Em-
pire Storage & Ice to change its economic practices, while the Claiborne boycotters were
trying to get stores to change their hiring practices and also to get county officials both to
change their hiring practices and to make other political decisions. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at
899-900. Nonetheless, in an economy dominated by private business, trying to influence
private sector decisions is political activity just as is trying to influence public sector deci-
sions. In any event, if Giboney is indeed limited to activity aimed at accomplishing purely
economic ends, then it would be inapplicable in all the examples I gave at the start of this
section. See supra Part II.A.
205 See infra note 319 and accompanying text (discussing this issue).
206 See supra Introduction.
207 See Giboney, 336 U.S. at 503 n.6 (quoting Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl,
315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942) (Douglas J., concurring)); see also Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494, 529-30 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment) (reasoning that
picketing should be lcss constitutionally protected because "the loyalties and responses
evoked and exacted by picket lines differentiate this form of expression from other modes
of communication").
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sage. It should be restrictable to the extent that its
noncommunicative elements cause harm-for instance if it is too loud
or blocks the entrance to a building-but not restrictable based on its
message (again, unless the message falls within an exception to pro-
tection 20 8). This protection should exist even when the message on
the picket signs is very simple-"the labor movement wants you to
boycott this business"-and not backed with a detailed explanation.
First Amendment law protects even simple symbols, from flagburning
to black armbands. 20 9 The same should be true for the simple mes-
sage "don't patronize places, such as this one, that the union move-
ment condemns. '210
Nonetheless, Giboney belongs to a long line of cases that imposed
special restraints on picketing, restraints that would likely be unconsti-
tutional as to other media. 211 The speech in Giboney--speech urging a
business to violate state restraint of trade laws and urging people not
to patronize the business until it so acted-would probably be pro-
tected today if it were printed in a newspaper or on leaflets. Such
advocacy doesn't seem to be both intended to and likely to produce
208 It's possible that some of the Court's willingness to restrict even peaceful picketing
stems from the Justices' sense that labor picketing is inherently threatening to some ex-
tent-perhaps because labor picketing involves face-to-face confrontations between picket-
ers who feel their livelihoods are at stake and others whom the picketers might see as
jeopardizing those livelihoods, and because historically, some labor picketing has indeed
turned violent. I don't think that this potential for violence should suffice to strip peaceful
picketing of protection, But to the extent that this reasoning suggests that Giboney and
similar cases flowed from the Court's tendency to protect picketing-or at least labor pick-
eting-less than other speech, it further shows the impropriety of applying Giboney outside
the picketing context.
20q See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405-06 (1989); Tinker v. Des Moines In-
dep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
210 I thus think that the distinction drawn by Justice Stevens in his concurrence in the
judgment in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, 447 U.S. 607 (1980)-where he voted to
uphold a secondary picketing ban because it affected "only that aspect of the union's ef-
forts to communicate its views that calls for an automatic response to a signal, rather than a
reasoned response to an idea," id. at 619-is unsound. See Getman & Marshall, supra note
204, at 719 n.97 (reasoning that "appeal to one's obligations as a union member or sup-
porter" should be just as protected as "more cerebral appeals"); Theodore J. St. Antoine,
Justice Frank Murphy and American Labor Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 1900, 1908 (2002) ("[I]f the
viewer's reaction is a genuinely voluntary, though relatively unthinking, reflex, how can the
picketing that triggers the reaction be distinguished from the cryptic bumper stickers 'Vote
Free Choice' or 'Vote Right to Life'?").
211 See, e.g., Retail Store Employees Union, 447 U.S. at 619; Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Local
695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950);
Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942); TRIBE, supra note 49, at
826 (describing this line of cases); see also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 578 (1965)
(Black, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("Picketing, though
it may be utilized to communicate ideas, is not speech, and therefore is not of itself pro-
tected by the First Amendment." (citing Giboney and Hughes)).
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imminent illegal conduct, the criteria set forth in Brandenburg as neces-
sary for making speech into punishable incitement of illegal action.
2 12
Likewise, consider Hughes v. Superior Court,2 1 3 a case that shortly
followed Giboney.2 14 Hughes rejected the First Amendment claims of
people who were peacefully picketing a store to pressure it into hiring
black workers in proportion to the fraction of blacks among the
store's clientele.2 15 There was no powerful union acting with the ben-
efit of special legal protections. There was no violence or trespass by
the picketers. The picketers had no power to eject people from a
union.
The picketers simply patrolled and expressed sentiments aimed
at getting a store to act in a perfectly legal way-under California law
in 1950, discriminatory hiring was not illegal.2 1 6 Newspaper articles
urging a consumer boycott of businesses aimed at getting the busi-
nesses to adopt some legally permissible race-based hiring practice
212 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969); see also Hess v. Indiana, 414
U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973) (holding that advocacy of illegal conduct at some unspecified
future time doesn't satisfy the imminence requirement). In the closely-related context of
secondary boycotts-union boycotts of a third party aimed at pressuring the third party to
stop doing business with an employer that's the subject of a strike-the Supreme Court has
strongly suggested that leafleting and other speech would be constitutionally protected,
even though picketing is not. Compare Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 501 v. NLRB, 341
U.S. 694, 705 n.10 (1951) (holding picketing in aid of secondary boycotts is not protected,
citing Giboney and cases that cited Giboney), with Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf
Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575-76, 580, 588 (1988) (holding that
the National Labor Relations Act should not be read as banning leafleting aimed at per-
suading consumers to engage in a secondary boycott, because such a reading would pose
"serious constitutional questions," and resting its decision on the view that "picketing is
qualitatively 'different from other modes of communication'" (quoting Babbitt v. Farm
Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 280, 311 n.17 (1950)).
213 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
214 Hughes relied on Giboney, among other cases, for the proposition that picketing may
be restricted. See id. at 465-66, 468. Three Justices relied solely on Giboney. See id. at 469
(Black, J.,joined by Minton,J., concurring in the judgment); id. (Reed,J., concurring); see
also Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 354 U.S. at 292 (characterizing Hughes as an "elaborat[ion]" of
Giboney).
215 See Hughes, 339 U.S. at 461, 468.
216 Justice Reed took the view that the California Supreme Court opinion held race
discrimination to be unlawful, id at 469 (Reed, J., concurring), but he was mistaken. The
California Supreme Court majority opinion, Hughes v. Supreme Court, 198 P.2d 885 (Cal.
1948), never held this, and Justice Traynor's dissenting opinion specifically pointed out
that employers remained free to discriminate based on race. See Hughes, 198 P.2d at 896
(Traynor, J., dissenting); see alsoJones v. American President Lines, Ltd., 308 P.2d 393, 395
(Cal. Ct. App. 1957) (stating, several years after Hughes, that "[t]he right to private employ-
ment without discrimination on the basis of race is not one protected by the Constitution,
by common law or any statute of the state that we are aware of; and so plaintiff has not
alleged any violation of state or federal laws"). The California Supreme Court held only
that picketing to pressure employers into discrimination was unlawful, not that employer
discrimination was itself unlawful. See Osmond K. Fraenkel, Peaceful Picketing-Constitution-
ally Protected?, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 9 (1950) (recognizing this distinction); Elliot L. Richard-
son, Freedom of Expression and the Function of Courts, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20 n.86 (1951)
(same).
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would likely have been constitutionally protected. The advocacy, the
Court stressed, was unprotected because it was conveyed through
picketing.21 7
The lesser protection for picketing than for other speech, at least
as to labor picketing, continues to be the law,21 8 and Giboney reflects
this exception to First Amendment protection. But even if one en-
dorses this lesser protection for picketing, such an exception offers no
support for applying Giboney to other speech.
C. Supreme Court Applications of Giboney
So far, I've argued that it's hard to figure out just what line
Giboney purported to draw-and the cases in which the Court has
cited Giboney to support its results only further suggest that Giboney is
unhelpful for First Amendment analysis. Even when the results of
those cases might be right, the "illegal course of conduct" principle
generally doesn't help justify the results.
I've already alluded to one example-the majority opinion in Cox
v. Louisiana,2 t9 which tried to use Giboney to explain restrictions on
crime-advocating speech and on fighting words:
The examples are many of the application by this Court of the prin-
ciple that certain forms of conduct mixed with speech may be regu-
lated or prohibited. The most classic of these was pointed out long
ago by Mr. Justice Holmes: 'The most stringent protection of free
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre
and causing a panic.' Schenck v. United States .... A man may be
punished for encouraging the commission of a crime, Fox v. Wash-
ington ... , or for uttering 'fighting words,' Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire .... This principle has been applied to picketing and
parading in labor disputes. See Hughes v. Superior Court ... ;
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.... ; Building Service Employ-
ees, etc. v. Gazzam .... But cf. Thornhill v. Alabama .... These
authorities make it clear, as the Court said in Giboney, that 'it has
never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to
217 See Hughes, 339 U.S. at 464-65 (stressing that the case involved picketing and not
newspaper articles).
Publication in a newspaper, or by distribution of circulars, may convey the
same information or make the same charge as do those patrolling a picket
line. But the very purpose of a picket line is to exert influences, and it
produces consequences, different from other modes of communication.
The loyalties and responses evoked and exacted by picket lines are unlike
those flowing from appeals by printed word.
Id, at 465.
218 Compare NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, 447 U.S. 607, 616 (1980) (uphold-
ing restrictions on secondary picketing), with Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575-76, 588 (1988) (suggesting that leaflet-
ing aimed at the same end may well be constitutionally protected).
219 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
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make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in
part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, ei-
ther spoken, written, or printed.' Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice
Co .... 220
But four years later, the Brandenburg Court held that encouraging the
commission of a crime was constitutionally protected, except under
narrow circumstances. 22 1 Thus, the prosecution in Fox, for publishing
a newspaper article praising the practice of nudism,2 22 would clearly
be unconstitutional today.2 2 3
Likewise, uttering words that may cause a fight would also be con-
stitutionally protected today, unless the words are specifically targeted
at the offended party.2 24 This distinction in modern fighting words
law between unprotected speech "directed to the person of the
hearer"225 ("Fuck you" said to a particular person) and protected
speech said to the world at large ("Fuck the draft" said on a jacket)
may be sound. But the Giboney principle that speech may be punisha-
ble when it carries out an illegal course of conduct doesn't help justify
that distinction.
Similarly, consider Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass 'n, 226 in which the
Court upheld Ohralik's punishment for "[i]n-person solicitation by a
lawyer of remunerative employment. '" 22 7 The Court cited Giboney in
arguing that such solicitation was constitutionally unprotected, and
characterized the solicitation as "a business transaction in which
speech is an essential but subordinate component." 228 But in Ohralik's
companion case, In rePrimus,229 the Court made clear that direct solic-
itation by a lawyer of pro bono employment in a politically charged
case may not be restricted.23°
Both transactions were equally "course [s] of conduct," in which
speech to the client played an equal role. If the Giboney principle
220 Id. at 563 (internal citations abbreviated); see also Rubenfeld, supra note 13, at 830
(defending bans on fighting words on the grounds that "such speech is properly regarded
as an attempt to commence a fight-a particularized, prohibited course of conduct").
221 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969).
222 See Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 273, 267-78 (1915).
223 Likewise, American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399-400 (1950),
which upheld restrictions on Communists' serving as union leaders, id. at 399-400 (citing
Giboney, among other cases), is also probably not good law today. See United States v.
Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 262 (1967) (striking down restrictions on Communists' working in
defense plants).
224 See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
20 (1971).
225 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.
226 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
227 [d. at 457.
228 Id. at 456-57.
229 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
230 Id. at 438-39.
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stripped one solicitation of constitutional protection on the ground
that the solicitation carried out an illegal course of conduct, it should.
have done the same to the other, yet the two were treated differently.
The Court's other justification for its Ohralik decision-that the
speech in Ohralik was commercial speech said face-to-face,2 3' while the
speech in Primus was noncommercial speech communicated in a let-
ter232-may be a sound basis for distinguishing the two cases. Giboney,
though, is not.
Likewise, California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited233
held that while legitimate litigation constitutes the exercise of the First
Amendment right to petition the courts and is thus immune from an-
titrust liability, "sham" litigation aimed at "eliminat[ing] an applicant
as a competitor by denying him free and meaningful access to the
agencies and courts" is unprotected. 234 The Court relied primarily on
Giboney, reasoning that "First Amendment rights are not immunized
from regulation when they are used as an integral part of conduct
which violates a valid statute."2 35
But in Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus-
tries,236 the Court explicitly limited this "sham litigation" exception to
litigation that is both objectively frivolous and subjectively ill-moti-
vated.23 7 Under the Giboney rationale, objectively reasonable and un-
reasonable litigation would equally be "integral part[s] of conduct"2 38
aimed at monopolization; they should thus be treated equally. Yet Pro-
fessional Real Estate Investors recognizes that objectively reasonable liti-
gation is a constitutionally protected exercise of the right to petition,
and that's true whether or not it is "an integral part of conduct" aimed
at securing a monopoly. The constitutionally significant distinction is
between frivolous petitioning of the courts, which is unprotected by
the Petition Clause against a wide range of liability, and objectively
reasonable petitioning, which is protected. It is not, as Giboney would
suggest, between petitioning that is an integral part of a broader pat-
tern of conduct and petitioning that can't be so described.
New York v. Ferber239 and Osborne v. Ohio,2 40 which upheld bans on
distributing and possessing child pornography, 24' similarly illustrate
231 See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-56.
232 See Pfimus, 436 U.S. at 437-38.
233 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
234 Id. at 515.
235 Id. at 514.
236 508 U.S. 49 (1993).
237 Id. at 60-61.
238 Cal. Motor Transp. Co., 404 U.S. at 514.
239 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
240 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
241 Osbornte, 495 U.S. at 108-09; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 774.
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the error of relying on Giboney. Ferber and Osborne both argued in
passing:
[T] he advertising and selling of child pornography provide an eco-
nomic motive for and are thus an integral part of the production of
such materials, an activity illegal throughout the Nation. "It rarely
has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and
press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral
part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute." Giboney.
242
Yet not all speech that provides a motive for illegal conduct can be
outlawed simply because it is "an integral part of conduct in violation
of a valid criminal statute." When the New York Times publishes ille-
gally leaked documents, 243 or transcripts of an illegally excerpted con-
versation, it would have a strong First Amendment defense (assuming
that it got the documents or tapes from an independent third party),
even though the prospect of such publication may provide a motive
for the illegal leak or illegal interception.
244
In some narrow circumstances, there might be some constitu-
tional justification for restricting the publication of the leaked mate-
rial-for instance, if there is some extraordinarily pressing national
security concern.2 45 This would be similar to the reasons the Court
articulated in Ferber and Osborne to justify the child pornography ex-
ception to the First Amendment. 246 But the broad Giboney "speech...
used as an integral part of conduct" argument cannot, by itself, justify
the restriction, or else all publication of illegally leaked documents
would be treated the same way as publication of illegally created child
pornography.24 7
242 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761-62, quoted in Osborne, 495 U.S. at 110 (quoting Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949)).
243 The leak may be illegal because it violates a law that requires government employ-
ees to keep certain information confidential, a law that imposes a duty of loyalty on corpo-
rate employees, or trade secret law. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual
Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 Hous. L. REv. 697,
739-48 (2003) (discussing this point).
244 See Barmicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533-34 (2001); Landmark Communications,
Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 841-42 (1978).
245 Cf New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 735-40 (1971) (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment, joined by Stewart, J.) (suggesting that publishing illegally
leaked national security secrets might well be criminally punishable); id. at 752-59
(Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.) (concluding that such
publication could even be enjoined).
246 See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758-59 n.10 (stressing the harmful and valueless nature of
child pornography); Osborne, 495 U.S. at 108-11 (same).
247 See Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 Sup.
Cr. REv. 285, 300 (criticizing Ferber's use of Giboney).
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D. Rejecting Giboney
Giboney, then, is a poor basis for analyzing speech restrictions.
The case itself provides no clear rule distinguishing speech that's con-
stitutionally protected from speech that's stripped of constitutional
protection. The cases applying Giboney don't help either. Some of
those cases use Giboney to reach results that are inconsistent with mod-
ern First Amendment law. Other cases may reach results that fit
within modern First Amendment doctrine, but the real foundation for
the decisions in those cases is something other than the Giboney princi-
ple. The citation of Giboney only obscures the true rationale.
The Supreme Court decided Giboney in 1949, when the Justices
were still in the early stages of developing free speech doctrine. Many
of the speech-protective Supreme Court decisions of the modern era,
such as Brandenburg, Cohen, and Claiborne Hardware, were still decades
in the future. It isn't surprising that some of the applications of
Giboney have proven to be inconsistent with these more recent cases.
If we endorse these more recent decisions, this should lead us to re-
ject Giboney as a guide to modern free speech law.
III
SITUATION-ALTERING UTTERANCES
I turn now to a third category of "speech as conduct" arguments,
made famous in the First Amendment literature by Kent Greenawalt's
Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language,248 and in the philosophy of lan-
guage literature by J.L. Austin 249 and John Searle.2 50 I will focus on
Greenawalt's approach; since Austin and Searle were philosophers of
language rather than lawyers, their concern was with discussing how
words are used by people, rather than with drawing legally significant
distinctions, and their arguments are thus of limited help for First
Amendment doctrine.25 1
248 See GREFNAWALT, supra note 23.
249 SeeJ. L. AUSTIN, How TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS (1962).
250 See JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH AcTs: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
(1969).
251 Austin, for instance, casts his book as a criticism of the "assumption of philosophers
that the business of a 'statement' can only be to 'describe' some state of affairs, or to 'state
some fact,' which it must do either truly or falsely." AUSTIN, supra note 249, at 1. He then
proceeds to disprove that assumption, by pointing out how words can be used in a
"performative" sense as well as the fact-declaring "constative" sense, and in the process
includes within the "performative" category statements that "criticize," "predict," "esti-
mate," "advise," "recommend," "warn," "urge," and "plead." Id. at 83, 85-86, 140, 147, 155.
This makes clear that the performative/constative line isn't immediately helpful to lawyers
who are trying to distinguish protected speech from unprotected speech-as-conduct, even
if it is helpful to philosophers who are trying to understand how people communicate. Cf
GREENAWALT, supra note 23, at 58 (making the same observation about Austin's "performa-
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Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language contends that some kinds of
statements-for instance, "I promise to help you commit this crime,"
-"I'll raise my prices if you raise yours," or "I will" said in a wedding
ceremony-are constitutionally unprotected conduct rather than pro-
tected speech 252 because they impose, as a matter of social conven-
tion, a felt moral obligation (on the speaker or on listeners):253
Utterances are often a means for changing the social context in
which we live .... The conventions of language and of ordinary
social morality make certain utterances, such as promises, count as
far as one's moral obligations are concerned. My essential claim-a
central claim for this book-is that utterances of these sorts are situ-
ation-altering and are outside the scope of a principle of free
speech. Such utterances are ways of doing things, not of asserting
things .... 254
Such "situation-altering utterances" (the book's term) aren't lim-
ited to statements that create legal obligations. 255 For instance, even a
legally unenforceable agreement to commit a crime or to set prices,
or a legally ineffective wedding (for instance, a wedding that all ob-
servers know to be a legally unrecognized same-sex or polygamous
wedding), would qualify. Nor are "situation-altering utterances" lim-
ited to statements that create obligations that most of us would recog-
nize as morally binding; a promise to kill someone may not be morally
binding, but it is treated as situation-altering. 256 Rather, the argument
goes, "situation-altering utterances" encompass all statements that af-
fect someone's felt moral obligations, simply by virtue of the state-
ment's having been made. 257
tive" utterances, and stressing that "situation-altering utterances" are a "much narrower
[category] than Austin's category of performatives").
Austin's categories of "locutionary act[s]" ("uttering a certain sentence with a certain
sense and reference"), "illocutionary acts" (for instance, "informing, ordering, warning,
undertaking, &c, i.e., utterances which have a certain (conventional) force"), and
"perlocutionary acts" ("what we bring about or achieve by saying something, such as con-
vincing, persuading, deterring, and even, say, surprising or misleading"), are even less
suited to providing constitutionally significant distinctions. AUSTIN, supra note 249, at 108.
I have no reason to think that Austin or Austin's modem heirs would argue otherwise.
Even if some kinds of illocutionary acts, such as undertaking in the sense of promising to
do something, might be constitutionally unprotected, other illocutionary acts-for in-
stance, "informing"-surely are protected. Likewise, the perlocutionary acts of "convinc-
ing" and "persuading" must certainly be constitutionally protected. Id.; see also id. at 102
(distinguishing "the locutionary act 'he said that...' from the illocutionary act 'he argued
that. . .' and the perlocutionary act 'he convinced me that. .. '
252 GREENAWALT, supra note 23, at 239.
253 See id. at 57-58.
254 Id. (footnotes omitted).
255 See id. at 60.
256 See id. at 63.
257 See id. ("Whether or not an agreement to perform an evil act has geniue moral
force, the agreement will usually be viewed by the people who have made it as having such
force, and it will also accomplish a change in their expectations and perceived responsibili-
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Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language has been justly lauded, and
while I disagree with it in some measure, I don't intend to critique it
in detail. I do, however, want to offer two observations about its "situa-
tion-altering utterance" theory.
A. The Doctrine's Limited Scope
First, it is important to recognize that Speech, Crime, and the Uses of
Language itself limits this "speech as conduct" category. "Situation-al-
tering utterances," as the book defines them, certainly do not cover all
attempts to "do things with words" or to "alter" the "situation" by
speaking. People often use simple assertions of facts or ideas, which
the book excludes from the definition of situation-altering utter-
ances, 255 to do things. When a newspaper publishes an editorial advo-
cating some new welfare policy, or urging citizens to recycle, it is
trying to accomplish a certain result-a substantive change in peo-
ple's conduct. Such clearly constitutionally protected speech often
"alters" the "situation" by its persuasive or informative force, through
the process of "alter[ing] the listener's understanding of the world he
inhabits.1 259 But that doesn't place it within the definition of "situa-
tion-altering. ,260
The definition also does not include all statements that change
people's felt moral obligations. Telling people that some seemingly
benign behavior is harmful to others, for instance, may impose on
them a moral obligation to avoid such harm. A man who is told that
he has a communicable disease has different moral (and perhaps le-
gal) obligations to others than one who thinks that he is healthy. But
such statements that reveal preexisting facts are treated as protected
speech, not as constitutionally unprotected "situation-altering" con-
duct, even though they do change people's moral obligations.26'
Rather, the "situation-altering utterances" category is limited to
statements that "actually alter the normative world, shifting rights or
obligations" because of their very assertion, and not because of any
facts or ideas that they reveal. 262 A promise, for instance, imposes a
ties,"). Thus, under this definition, one's statement agreeing to participate in a criminal
conspiracy is situation-altering, so long as one's fellow criminals feel that the statement is
morally binding.
258 See id. at 57, 59-60 (distinguishing situation-altering utterances from "claims of fact
or value").
259 Id. at 59.
260 Id. at 59-60. Under the Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language framework, it might,
at least in some cases, qualify as a "weak imperative," id. at 68-71, or as "action-inducing,"
Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 Am. B. FoUND. REs.J. 645, 683-85. But the book
makes clear that such speech is still presumptively protected, and doesn't count as situa-
tion-altering in the book's scheme. See GREENAWALT, supra note 23, at 59-60.
261 See GRFENAWALT, supra note 23, at 61-62.
262 See id. at 59-60.
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perceived moral obligation on the promisor.2 63 An order by someone
in a position of authority obligates the ordered person to do
something.2 64
Situation-altering statements affect people, but not by communi-
cating some preexisting fact or idea that exists outside the speaker's
control. Rather, such statements-"exercises of official authority,
agreements, promises, orders, offers, manipulative inducements, and
manipulative threats" 265-affect people chiefly because the speaker
has made them. Thus, the argument goes, the statements should be
treated as constitutionally unprotected action, not constitutionally
protected speech.2 66
This definition means that very little, if any, of the speech I de-
scribed in previous sections-speech that some people have argued
should be treated as merely "conduct"267-would constitute "situa-
tion-altering utterances." Speech that communicates information
about how a crime can be effectively committed would not be situa-
tion-altering. Such speech, whether in a novel, chemistry textbook, or
murder manual, would simply be an "assertion [ ] of fact,"2 68 albeit a
potentially dangerous one.
Likewise, speech that creates an offensive work environment, of-
fensive educational environment, or offensive public accommodations
environment is generally the assertion of offensive ideas2 69 and not an
agreement, promise, order, or the like. The same principle applies to
speech praising jury nullification, speech that urges the moral propri-
ety of a boycott, or speech that recommends marijuana to a patient.
263 See id. at 63-65. I will generally speak in this section of "felt moral obligations" or
"perceived moral obligations," which is to say moral obligations that some people are likely
to recognize, whether or not the obligation is legally enforceable, and whether or not the
obligation is morally valid. This definition reflects the Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Lan-
guage definition of what statements are situation-altering, see id at 59-60, and it's necessary
for the book's argument to work: An agreement to commit a crime or to fix prices, for
instance, is "situation-altering" even if it's legally unenforceable and morally valid, because
the parties will perceive it as imposing a moral obligation on them. See id. at 63-65.
264 Id. at 65-66.
265 Id. at 58.
266 Id. Greenawalt excludes from this list agreements that themselves concern speech;
as to such agreements, "the subject of the agreement makes a free speech principle rele-
vant." Id. at 64, 335-37.
267 See supra notes 2-18 and 163-76 and accompanying text.
268 GREENAWALT, supra note 23, at 58, 60-63 (distinguishing situation-altering utter-
ances from assertions of fact).
269 For instance, ideas that some groups are inferior, or that women should be seen as
sex objects rather than equals in the workplace. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards,
Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1502-07 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Barbetta v. Chemlawn Servs. Corp., 669
F. Supp. 569, 573 (W.D.N.Y. 1987); Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transfor-
mation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. Rav. 1183, 1212 n.118 (1989); Amy Horton, Com-
ment, Of Supervision, Centerfolds, and Censorship: Sexual Harassment, the First Amendment, and
the Contours of Title VII, 46 U. MAMi L. REv. 403, 438 (1991).
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Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language actually deals with more
than situation-altering utterances; other sections of the book discuss
crime-facilitating speech, offensive speech, speech urging illegal or
harmful behavior, and the like. 270 But the book correctly treats the
latter categories of speech as assertions of fact and value, and thus as
presumptively constitutionally protected speech, rather than as unpro-
tected situation-altering utterances. 27 I And the book then analyzes
the costs and benefits of restricting the speech, and concludes that a
good deal of such speech should indeed be protected, though some
can be properly restricted under some exception to First Amendment
protection. 272
B. The Questionable Relevance of Altering Felt Moral
Obligations
As I explained above, the premise of the "situation-altering utter-
ances" argument is that when a statement's utterance imposes-as a
matter of social convention-a felt moral obligation on the speaker or
on the listeners, the statement stops being speech and becomes con-
duct.273 This argument is how the book explains the widely shared
belief that agreements and offers are not protected as free speech.
2 74
Promises create a felt moral obligation, which "the people who have
made [the promise perceive] as having [moral] force." 275  The
promises trigger a "convention[ ] . . . of ordinary social morality"276
that one should keep one's promises, and the violation of this conven-
tion "renders [the promisors] vulnerable to counterresponses,"2 77
which is what makes the promise situation-altering. Similarly, speech
the book calls a "permission" waives felt moral obligations rather than
creating them, and thus it too is situation-altering.2 78
But why should a statement's creating a felt moral obligation turn
that statement from presumptively constitutionally protected speech
into unprotected conduct? After all, there are many social conven-
270 See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 23, at 85-87, 110-29, 141-57, 260-80, 287-313.
271 See id.
272 See id.
273 Id. at 57-58.
274 See, e.g., Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 55 (1982) (explaining that "the fact that an
agreement [to engage in illegal conduct] necessarily takes the form of words does not
confer upon it, or upon the underlying conduct, the constitutional immunities the First
Amendment extends to speech," and that "while solicitation to enter into an agreement
arguably crosses the hazy line distinguishing conduct from pure speech..., [it] remains in
essence an invitation to engage in an illegal exchange . and may properly be
prohibited").
275 GREENAWALT, supra note 23, at 63; id. at 64-65 (making clear that the same analysis
applies to unilateral promises as well as to bilateral agreements).
276 id. at 58.
277 Id. at 63.
278 See id. at 58, 63.
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tions under which the making of a statement will be seen by some as
increasing the speaker's moral obligations, or increasing or decreas-
ing the listener's moral obligations.2 79 Consider just four examples:
(a) The felt moral impropriety of hypocrisy. There is a perceived
moral duty to avoid hypocrisy-to act consistently with what
one says. If a speaker says that all soldiers fighting in a war
are murderers, he is implicitly undertaking a moral obliga-
tion to refuse to fight in the war. His very statement makes
many people expect that he will practice what he preaches.
As with promises, "utterances can alter one's normative ob-
ligations, what one should do in the future. The conven-
tions of language and of ordinary social morality," here the
moral condemnation of hypocrisy, make this utterance
"count as far as one's moral obligations are concerned."280
(b) The felt moral relevance of peers' and leaders' moral permissions.
People perceive-rightly or wrongly-that they may do
what the leaders of their community, or their peers, think is
permissible. When either a leader or a large peer group
says that "it's fine to refuse to deal with people of other eth-
nic groups," many people might feel less of an obligation to
act in a nondiscriminatory way.281
(c) The felt moral relevance of peers' and leaders' moral demands.
People also sometimes feel that they should do what leaders
or peers think is necessary. For instance, when the leaders
or peers say, "One should refuse to deal with people of oth-
er ethnic groups," many people might feel something of an
obligation to engage in such an ethnic boycott. In both this
example and the previous one, the leader's or peers' "utter-
ance[ has] alter[ed the listener's] normative obligations,
what [he] should do in the future"2 2-in the earlier exam-
279 Under the Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language framework, any of these three
types of change to moral obligations would make a statement situation-altering. See id. at
63-65 (stating that promises are situation-altering because they increase the speaker's felt
moral obligations); id. at 65 (stating that permissions are situation-altering because they
decrease the listener's felt moral obligations, by allowing the listener to do something that
he might have otherwise seen as immoral); id. at 65 (stating that orders are situation-alter-
ing because they increase the listener's felt moral obligations). The missing fourth cate-
gory is statements that decrease a speaker's own moral obligations, but I take it that people
can rarely decrease their own felt moral obligations just by speaking, and if they can do so,
then perhaps the obligations were not so obligatory in the first place.
280 See id. at 57-58. Perhaps the utterance counts less than the statement, "I promise
not to drink alcohol," or especially, "We mutually promise to each other not to drink alco-
hol," but it does count.
281 "Situation-altering utterances" include statements that diminish a listener's moral
obligations-for instance, a permission such as, "Go ahead and hit me, I wish you'd try it."
Id. at 65.
282 Id. at 58.
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ple, by weakening the listener's normative obligation not to
discriminate, and in this example by imposing a new obliga-
tion to discriminate. 28 3
(d) The felt professional obligation to respond. In scholarship, and
likely in other fields, there is a social convention that peo-
ple ought to respond to their serious critics. A scientist who
fails to respond to his critics may be condemned by his
peers, just as a scientist who fails to keep his promises may
be condemned by his peers. This is true regardless of
whether the critics persuade the peers: The critics' very
making of the statements creates something of an obliga-
tion to respond.284
All these examples satisfy the criteria for situation-altering utter-
ances. The statements change the speaker's, the listener's, or the crit-
icized person's felt moral obligations, simply by having been made.
Naturally, if the statements are especially persuasive, they also create
an obligation through their persuasiveness. But the statements
change obligations independently of their persuasiveness: For in-
stance, even if most of the antiwar speaker's audience isn't persuaded
that the war is evil, the speaker will still have incurred a felt moral
obligation to act consistently with what he had said.
Yet it's not clear that any of these statements "are ways of doing
things, not of asserting things";2 5 and even if these statements are
both ways of doing things and of asserting things, it's not clear that
what they do should be any less constitutionally protected than what
they assert. While the statements create or waive felt moral obliga-
tions, they do so by communicating, just as pure statements of fact or
value sometimes create or waive felt moral obligations. I suspect that
most people's first reaction to the statements described above would
be that they are pure speech, and the "situation-altering utterance"
theory doesn't explain why we should take a different view. I share
the intuition that agreements and offers should be constitutionally un-
protected. But it seems to me that the "situation-altering utterances"
framework-which theorizes that agreements and offers alter felt
283 The obligation may be morally controversial, not very strong, and not equally felt
by everyone, but the same is true of many promises, especially promises to do illegal things.
284 See GREENAWALT, supra note 23, at 144 (suggesting that some fighting words might
be situation-altering because they create a felt moral obligation on the target to respond; a
professional challenge may have even more obligatory force). Of course, the felt moral
obligation in one situation might be to fight, and in the other to speak. But under the
"situation-altering utterance" theory, both seem to be situation-altering utterances, because
both do something (create a moral obligation, even if it is just a moral obligation to say
something) rather than merely communicating assertions of fact or value.
285 Id. at 58.
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moral obligations, and that speech that alters felt moral obligations is
unprotected-is not entirely persuasive.
It's possible, even accepting the "situation-altering utterance" the-
ory, to explain why the examples I give should remain constitutionally
protected despite their situation-altering component: Banning such
statements would also make it hard to convey the facts and opinions
that the statements convey; banning overt promises or offers, on the
other hand, would probably still leave people free to convey the same
facts and opinions, just by changing their statements in some mea-
sure. Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language in fact suggests this sort of
distinction, 28 6 though it sometimes seems to take a different
approach. 2 7
This approach may even fit the way the First Amendment gener-
ally deals with behavior that consists of both conduct and of speech.
Suppose that someone expresses facts or opinion using physical con-
286 See id. at 60 (acknowledging that agreements to marry convey certain facts and
opinions, but reasoning that "if we focus on opportunities for communication, whatever
one wants to communicate about facts and values can typically be asserted much more
straightforwardly by means other than a situation-altering utterance"); id. at 60-61 (ac-
knowledging that offers to bet convey "intensity of belief," but reasoning that "s]ince a
prohibition on betting would exert only a slight effect on people's ability to express the
certainty of their opinions, the betting example does not yield a very strong argument for
treating situation-altering utterances like statements of fact").
287 At times the book asks whether the situation-altering aspect of an utterance "domi-
nates" the assertions of fact or opinion. See, e.g., id. at 57 (saying, in the first paragraph of
the "Situation-Altering Utterances" section, that "I here examine some major uses [of lan-
guage] which are common subjects of criminal statutes and which do not dominantly in-
volve claims of fact or value"); id. at 60 ("Because the 'performaive' aspect of most such
utterances [such as agreements to marry] so entirely dominates any implicit claims of fact
and value and because similar implicit claims are present in virtually all noncommunicative
behavior, we need not alter our conclusion that a principle of free speech does not apply
to situation-altering utterances as it applies to claims of fact and value."). This, though,
strikes me as a mistaken approach. As John Hart Ely famously put it, much expressive
conduct is "100% action and 100% expression." Ely, supra note 125, at 1495. Neither
aspect is "domina[nr]" in principle, and even if it could be, courts couldn't practically
decide which component dominates the other. See id. The same is true of supposedly
situation-altering utterances: A speech by a respected community leader praising a race-
based boycott is both a means of trying to persuade people, and a means of making them
feel a moral obligation (or at least giving them moral permission) to act as the respected
leader suggests. The same goes for peer pressure from fellow community members. It is
not clear whether either factor can predominate in theory, and in any event, it is difficult
to see how one can decide which factor predominates in practice.
The same is also true for the matters that the "situation-altering utterance" theory is
trying to explain, such as agreements and offers. Going through a marriage ceremony--
even if it is not a legally binding ceremony-creates moral obligations, conveys facts about
the person's mental state, and often conveys the person's moral beliefs (especially when
the ceremony is controversial, for instance because it is a same-sex ceremony). An offer to
join a political conspiracy may likewise be at least as much a political statement as a state-
ment that changes people's felt moral obligations. Yet the law would punish such offers
and agreements without any inquiry into which element "predominates." Professor Green-
await would presumably reach the same result.
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duct that is harmful for reasons unrelated to the facts or opinions
conveyed-for instance, he uses loud amplification to express his mes-
sage. The government may then generally restrict this mixture of ex-
pression and physical conduct if the restriction (1) focuses on the
conduct element, (2) is narrowly tailored to an important government
interest in restricting the conduct, and (3) leaves open ample alterna-
tive channels for expressing the message.2 8 8 The same rule should
apply, the argument would go, to expressions of fact or opinion (pure
speech) that are also "situation-altering utterances" (speech that
ought to be treated as conduct).
But such an argument, I think, misses the point: In the examples
given above, all aspects of the speech-both its informational and per-
suasive value, and any felt change in moral obligation that the speech
might yield-should be constitutionally protected. True, the speech
may change people's felt moral obligations by creating peer pressure,
by taking advantage of professional norms, or by committing the
speaker to act in a certain way lest he face charges of hypocrisy. Even
if the government's aim in restricting the speech is only to prevent
such changed moral obligations, however, the restriction should be
unconstitutional, unless the speech falls within one of the exceptions
to protection. There should be no need for any complicated and
likely subjective inquiry into whether the prohibition would still leave
the speaker relatively free to convey the bare factual or ideological
assertions without the supposedly "situation-altering" factors.
C. The Problem of Agreements and Offers
Professor Greenawalt has certainly identified an important un-
resolved problem: Judges, scholars, and others generally believe (and
likely correctly believe) that certain statements-"exercises of official
authority, agreements, promises, orders, offers, manipulative induce-
ments, and manipulative threats" 2 8 9-are constitutionally unpro-
tected. Still, neither the Supreme Court nor the legal academy has
fully explained why this is so. 29 0
I suspect that this unresolved problem isn't that complex or novel
for exercises of official authority, official orders, orders within a busi-
ness, or orders within a criminal gang. These are threats: Do this or
you'll be fired, jailed, or perhaps even killed. 29 1 Speech, Crime, and the
Uses of Language itself acknowledges that unconditional threats should
288 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
289 See GREENAWALT, supra note 23, at 58.
290 See, e.g., Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 55-56 (1982) (reasoning that many,
though not all, promises are constitutionally unprotected, but not explaining why this is so,
or where the line should be drawn).
291 See GREENAWALT, supra note 23, at 65-66.
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be analyzed as speech rather than as situation-altering utterances, and
concludes (correctly) that they should generally be unprotected
speech.292 Likewise, the lack of protection given to manipulative
threats can also be justified under the general threats exception, 293
though I agree that this exception should be limited to exclude "warn-
ing threats."294
For agreements, offers, and manipulative inducements (which
are essentially a form of offer), the problem is considerably harder.2 95
I can't claim to have a solution to the problem, and this may be reason
to consider my criticisms of the "situation-uttering utterances" frame-
work with some skepticism: That framework, at least, proposes a solu-
tion, and I do not. Yet it seems to me that the expression of moral
commitment does not itself suffice to make speech into nonspeech
conduct.
Here, as elsewhere, it may be better to recognize that speech
which conveys an offer or a promise-and certainly the broader range
of speech that changes people's felt moral obligations-is indeed
speech, not merely conduct. Such speech sometimes does communi-
cate facts and ideas. It sometimes should be protected, for instance in
the examples mentioned above. But it should also sometimes be
restrictable for certain reasons, related to the harm that the speech
can cause and to its likely lack of First Amendment value. This is the
very sort of analysis that Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language itself
applies to other kinds of speech, such as false statements of fact, un-
conditional threats, and solicitation of crime 296-speech that should
be restrictable even though it isn't situation-altering.
And even if I'm mistaken, and even if agreements, offers, orders,
and manipulative threats should be seen as conduct rather than
speech, it's important to recognize that this "situation-altering utter-
ance" category is quite narrow. Statements of fact and value remain
speech, not conduct. Crime-facilitating speech, offensive speech, and
copycat-inspiring speech all remain speech, even if one accepts the
"situation-altering utterances" framework.
292 See id. at 90-91, 290-92.
293 See, e.g., id. at 91.
294 See Wurtz v. Risley, 719 F.2d 1438, 1443 (9th Cir. 1983); State v. Robertson, 649
P.2d 569, 578 (Or. 1982); John Sauer, Conditional Threats and the First Amendment
(draft manuscript, on file with author).
295 Agreements literally involve nothing but speech. A conspiracy is formed not by the
agreement inside each conspirator's head, which co-conspirators and jurors usually won't
learn about, but by the expression of that agreement to the co-conspirators. Sometimes
the conspirator may agree without words, for instance by nodding, or by carrying out a task
on behalf of the conspiracy. But if there is a conspiracy, it must be that one conspirator's
action has intentionally expressed to another conspirator his agreement to work together.
296 See GREENAWALT, supra note 23, at 110-18, 130-40, 260-80, 290-92, 314-27.
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IV
THE UNCHARTED ZONES OF FREE SPEECH
I've argued above that when speech is restricted because of harms
caused by its content, we ought not try to evade the First Amendment
problem by simply renaming the speech "conduct." As William Van
Alstyne has written, pointing to two examples:
Lying on the witness stand is not less speech than lying about the
weather..., although it may also be perjury. The shout of "Fire!" is
not less speech in the Holmes instance than the shout of "Fire!"
from the mouth of an actor on the stage of the same theater, spo-
ken as but a word in a play. It is futile to argue that an appropriately
tailored law that punishes any or all of these utterances does not
abridge speech. It does, it is meant to, and one should not take re-
course to verbal subterfuge, e.g., that it is "speech-brigaded-with-ac-
tion" or "conduct" alone that is curtailed .... 297
But what, then, of the classic examples of speech that people say-
ought to be restricted under this rubric? Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n 29q followed its citation of Giboney by pointing to "the exchange
of information about securities, corporate proxy statements, the
exchange of price and production information among competitors,
and employers' threats of retaliation for the labor activities of
employees" as evidence that "the State does not lose its power to
regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the public whenever
speech is a component of that activity."299 Similarly, the Justice De-
partment followed its Giboney argument by listing a series of "inchoate
crimes," such as "conspiracy, facilitation, solicitation, bribery, coer-
cion, blackmail, and aiding and abetting, °30 0 as examples of speech
that can be prohibited as conduct.-0 1 Rice v. Paladin Enterprises,
297 William Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. REV. 107,
114 (1982). Professor Van Alstyne is of course not condemning these speech restrictions-
he is only condemning the attempt to deny that these are indeed speech restrictions. See id.
at 113-14.
298 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
299 Id. at 456 (internal citations omitted).
100 See U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supra note 17, at text accompanying n.57.
301 For a broader analysis of the political and institutional reasons that these examples
have long gone undiscussed, see Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A
Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 Horv. L. Rjv. 1765 (2004) [hereinafter
Schauer, The Boundaries ofthe First Amendment]. Professor Schauer argues that the existence
of these examples shows that "the speech with which the First Amendment is even slightly
concerned"-apparently using "concerned" as a descriptive rather than a normative
term-"is but a small subset of the speech that pervades every part of our lives," id. at 1784,
but I don't think this ratio is quite right. It seems to me that most speech that "pervades
every part of our lives"-most of the conversations we have, most of the e-mails we get or
send, and most of the mass media we read and hear-is indeed protected by the First
Amendment.
In any event, my point is normative, not descriptive. I am arguing that courts should
not ignore the First Amendment this way; whenever speech is being restricted based on its
1336 [Vol. 90:1277
SPEECH AS CONDUCT
Inc.,30 2 which held that some crime-facilitation speech was unpro-
tected,30 3 defended its position by arguing that
[w] ere the First Amendment to bar or to limit government regula-
tion of such "speech brigaded with action," the government would
be powerless to protect the public from . . . extortion or black-
mail[ ]; ... threats and other improper influences in official and
political matters[ 1; .. perjury and various cognate crimes[ ]; ...
criminal solicitation[ ]; ... conspiracy[ 1; ... [criminal] harass-
ment[ ];... forgery[ ]; ... successfully soliciting another to commit
suicide[ ]; . . .and the like.3" 4
Some judicial opinions have likewise pointed to speech by profession-
als to their clients as examples of speech that should be treated as
punishable conduct. 30 5
The explanation for why some such speech is unprotected, it
seems to me, should be the one that First Amendment law generally
gives: There are exceptions to the First Amendment's protection, and
the courts ought to identify the boundaries of those exceptions.
30 6
For instance, the Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio30 7 didn't deal with advo-
cacy of illegal conduct simply by describing it as the "inchoate
crime[ ]" of illegal advocacy, or by citing Giboney.308 Rather, the Court
acknowledged that such advocacy is presumptively protected speech
and carefully defined the narrow circumstances under which such ad-
vocacy can be punished.30 9
content, courts should explicitly explain why the restriction is permissible. And I am en-
couraged by Professor Schauer's acknowledgment that "the boundaries of the First
Amendment"-which at least include the rules about what speech courts recognize as rais-
ing First Amendment concerns-are being "push[ed] ... generally outward." See id. at
1797.
302 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
303 Id. at 267.
304 Id. at 244 (internal citations omitted).
305 See, e.g., Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 228 (1985) (White,J., concurring in the result)
(citing Giboney to support the proposition that "[t] he power of government to regulate the
professions is not lost whenever the practice of a profession entails speech"); Nat'l Ass'n
for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1053-55
(9th Cir. 2000) (citing Giboney for the same proposition, though noting that "communica-
tion that occurs during psychoanalysis is entided to constitutional protection, but it is not
immune from regulation").
306 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245-46 (2002) ("As a
general principle, the First Amendment bars the government from dictating what we see or
read or speak or hear. The freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain
categories of speech, including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography pro-
duced with real children.").
307 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
308 See id. at 447-49. But see Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563 (1965) (suggesting
four years earlier that "encouraging the commission of a crime" is indeed punishable, and
citing the Giboney language as supporting that position).
309 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 ("[C]onstitutional guarantees of free speech.., do
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
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Similarly, fraud, perjury, and forgery can be punished under the
false statements of fact exception. 310 "[E] mployers' threats of retalia-
tion for employees' labor activities"3 11 and other threats could be pun-
ished under the threats exception. 3 12 These exceptions aren't just
special cases of a "conduct unprotected, speech protected" principle.
They are separately crafted rules that let the government punish
speech in particular circumstances, based on arguments about the
harm and value of speech that are specific to each exception. The
same goes for some of the examples that I cite in the Introduction.3 13
Some speech that might qualify as "facilitation" or "aiding and abet-
ting," for instance, might be punished under a new "crime-facilitating
speech" exception, the possible boundaries of which I discuss
elsewhere.3 14
These boundaries, however, shouldn't be those of the crimes of
criminal facilitation (generally defined as recklessly or knowingly, and
sometimes even negligently, helping a criminal)3 15 and aiding and
abetting (generally defined as intentionally, or sometimes knowingly,
helping a criminal) .31 6 Not all such speech should be restrictable,
even if may fit within the definitions of those crimes: For instance, a
chemistry textbook that describes how explosives are made should be
constitutionally protected, even if it recklessly facilitates the construc-
tion of bombs by criminals. Rather, courts should develop the bound-
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action.").
I think solicitation of crime should be dealt with by modifying incitement doctrine.
Solicitation, like incitement, is a form of crime advocacy, but it is generally aimed at only
one person, and it is unlikely to persuade or inform that person of any political ideas. This
mightjustify relaxing the imminence standard for solicitation. Cf Cherry v. State, 306 A.2d
634, 639-41 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973). But see People v. Salazar, 362 N.W.2d 913, 917-18
(Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (relying on Brandenlurg to overturn a solicitation conviction on the
grounds that the defendant was trying to solicit someone to commit a crime some time in
the future, rather than imminently). See generally Volokh, Crime-Faciliating Speech, supra note
3, at 1107-08, 1127 (discussing why speech that is aimed solely at an audience that one
knows to consist of criminals and that is likely to help bring about crime should be
unprotected).
310 See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 620-21
(2003) (applying the false statements of fact exception to knowingly false statements even
outside defamation law).
311 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 456 (1978).
-312 See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 386 (1998); NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618-19 (1969).
313 See supra text accompanying notes 2-12.
.14 See Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 3. The crime-facilitating speech ex-
ception may also cover insiders' leaks of information about securities. Such leaks are an
example of crime-facilitating speech said to a small audience that the speaker knows is
likely to use the speech for criminal purposes: Trading based on inside information is
illegal, and the tip provides information that lets people engage in such conduct.
315 See supra note 4.
316 See supra note 31.
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aries by considering the usual First Amendment factors-the value of
the speech, 317 the harm that it causes, the difficulty of drawing certain
lines, the risk that punishing some speech will deter other speech, and
so on-and not just asking whether the speech constitutes "criminal
conduct."3 18
The same is true, I think, for blackmail and coercion. Some
speech that might be called blackmail and coercion should surely be
unprotected. Other speech-for instance, statements like, "Stop
shopping at these white-owned stores, or we'll publicize your noncom-
pliance with our boycott" or, "Stop engaging in certain real estate sell-
ing practices, or we'll distribute leaflets to your neighbors criticizing
you"-is constitutionally protected. 31 9 The lines between protected
and unprotected speech must be drawn, and scholars and courts have
suggested such lines (which would presumably become part of the
threats exception).3 20 But the lines can't be drawn based simply on
assertions that some speech is speech and other speech is conduct.
317 This, of course, implicates the perennial debates about which theory of First
Amendment value courts should use. See Adam M. Samaha, Litigant Sensitivity in First
Amendment Law, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1291, 1303 n.53 (2004) (citing the leading articles advo-
cating the various views). The Supreme Court has been notoriously reluctant to resolve
those debates and to settle on any theory-self-government, the search for truth, self-ex-
pression, and so on-as being the sole foundation of First Amendment law. See, e.g.,
Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L.
REv. 1615, 1617-19 (1987); Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation:
Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1212, 1217-23 (1983).
I need not, however, take sides on this subject. My argument here is simply that
whatever one thinks is the proper metric of First Amendment value, decisions about what
speech should be protected must turn on the factors I mentioned in the text (including
the value of the speech). These decisions should not turn on the characterization of
speech as "conduct," at least when the speech is being restricted precisely because of what
it communicates, and because of the harms that may flow from that communication.
318 See Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 3 (going through this analysis). One
can of course argue that a good deal of crime-facilitating speech-or other speech, such as
solicitation, agreements, and the like-should be unprotected on the grounds that it isn't
part of "public discourse," or is not expressed within one of the "social contexts that en-
velop and give constitutional significance to acts of communication." See Post, Recuperating
First Amendment Doctrine, supra note 143, at 1255, 1276-77, 1279; Robert C. Post, The Consti-
tutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARv. L. REv. 601 (1990); see also WEINSTEIN, supra note 143, at
44-48. These inquiries are closely related, I think, to the inquiries mentioned in the text,
especially inquiries into the value of the speech. But as I argue in Volokh, Crime-Facilitating
Speech, supra note 3, at 1114-22, much speech that helps some people commit crime is, at
the same time, also a potentially valuable contribution to other people's public discourse.
The label "aiding and abetting" is not an adequate way of drawing the line between public
discourse and other speech, or between valuable speech and valueless speech.
319 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982); Org. for a Better
Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) ("The claim that the expressions were intended
to exercise a coercive impact on respondent does not remove them from the reach of the
First Amendment. Petitioners plainly intended to influence respondent's conduct by their
activities; this is not fundamentally different from the function of a newspaper.").
320 See, e.g., Wurtz v. Risley, 719 F.2d 1438, 1443 (9th Cir. 1983); State v. Robertson, 649
P.2d 569, 578 (Or. 1982); GREENAWALT, supra note 23, at 90-92; Sauer, supra note 294.
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Some of the other categories of speech haven't gotten the atten-
tion that they deserve. Conspiracy and bribery, for instance, involve
agreements and offers of agreement. Not everything that is called
conspiracy or bribery, however, should be unprotected: A conspiracy
to teach Communist doctrine 32 1 or the propriety of polygamy,322 or a
conspiracy to obstruct the draft by persuading people that the draft is
wrong,3 2 3 should be protected. 324 So should a bribe in the form of "If
you vote for this law, our advocacy group will give you its valuable
endorsement during the next election season, 32 5 or a candidate's
promise to refund some of his salary to the county and thus to the
voters. 326 As I suggest in Part III.A, courts and commentators ought to
explain how one can distinguish constitutionally unprotected
promises from constitutionally protected ones-just as the law draws
lines between the constitutionally unprotected and the constitution-
ally protected within the categories of insults, false statements of fact,
and statements advocating illegal conduct.327
Courts and commentators should also do the same sort of line-
drawing for speech that might violate antitrust law or securities law.328
For instance, as Justice Holmes recognized, it's not obvious when the
publication of price and production information should be constitu-
tionally unprotected 329 (as opposed to just being admissible as evi-
321 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding conviction of conspir-
acy for teaching Communist doctrine); TIBE, supra note 49, at 846 ("Dennis is generally
deemed to mark the temporary eclipse of the Holmes-Brandeis formulation of the clear
and present danger test."); Vitiello, supra note 39, at 1219 (arguing that "were Dennis or the
World War I Era cases to arise today, the results would almost certainly be different");John
F. Wirenius, The Road to Brandenburg: A Look at the Evolving Understanding of the First Amend-
ment, 43 DRAKE L. REv. 1, 48 (1994) (concluding that "[t]he basic holding of Dennis was
overruled" in Brandenburg v. Ohio).
322 State v. Musser, 175 P.2d 724, 731 (Utah 1946) (upholding conspiracy conviction
for teaching the propriety of polygamy), vacated and remanded by 333 U.S. 95 (1948).
323 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52-53 (1919) (noting that Schenck was
prosecuted for, among other things, conspiracy to obstruct the draft).
324 See GREENAWALT, supra note 23, at 64, 335-37.
325 See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32
UCLA L. REv. 784, 809-11 (1985) (discussing this issue).
326 See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1982).
327 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
328 See Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779 F.2d 793, 798-99 (2d Cir. 1985) (Win-
ter, J., dissenting) (suggesting that proxy solicitation rules can't constitutionally be applied
to certain kinds of speech); Burt Neubome, The First Amendment and Government Regulation
of Capital Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 5, 40-63 (1989) (outlining some principles for analyz-
ing securities laws under the First Amendment); Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amend-
ment, supra note 301, at 1777-82 (noting this issue as to securities and antitrust laws).
329 See Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 412-13 (1921)
(Holmes, J., dissenting). See also Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Engrs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
697-99 (1978), which upheld a Sherman Act injunction barring a professional society
"from adopting any official opinion, policy statement, or guideline stating or implying that
competitive bidding is unethical." Id. The Court justified the injunction on the ground
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dence to prove that price-setting was actually price-fixing 330 ). But
wherever such a line should be drawn, it can't be drawn just by saying
that certain speech constitutes the conduct of attempted monopoliza-
tion, just as lobbying for anticompetitive legislation can't be outlawed
on the grounds that it constitutes attempted monopolization. 33 1
Treason poses a similar sort of problem. Some speech may well
be treasonous, even if we set aside speech that reveals state secrets33 2
or that informs the enemy of the sailing dates of troop transports.3 33
Axis Sally, for instance, was rightly punished for broadcasting, while
working for the Nazis, a radio program aimed at decreasing the mo-
rale of American soldiers.334
But at the same time, much speech that does help the enemy
must remain constitutionally protected. During war as during peace,
Americans have a right and responsibility to evaluate their govern-
ment's actions, and decide whether the actions-or the administra-
tion-need changing. To make these decisions we need to hear
various views on whether the war is going well, whether our actions
are morally in the right, and so on.
An American during the Vietnam War, for instance, should have
had the right to argue to his fellow citizens that the war was unwin-
nable, that the United States should pull out, and that voters should
that the Society had already been found guilty of illegally entering into agreements prohib-
iting competitive bidding, id. at 684 & n.5, and that courts have the power "to fashion
appropriate restraints" to prevent and to remedy such illegal behavior, id. at 697. In the
absence of illegal past agreement, an organization's claims about business ethics-for in-
stance, claims that it is unethical for professionals or businesses to deal with oppressive
governments or to employ cheap foreign labor-would be constitutionally protected even
if a law purported to condemn them as attempted "restraint[s] of trade."
330 Cf Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 488-90 (1993) (holding that speech may be
used as evidence of criminal intent or of physical behavior); Haupt v. United States, 330
U.S. 631, 642 (1947) (same, as to intent).
331 See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665-66 (1965); East-
ern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motors Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136-37 (1961).
For an example of an article that seriously addresses this First Amendment issue, see Ste-
phen G. Thompson, Antitrust, the First Amendment, and the Communication of Price Information,
56 TEMPLF L.Q. 939 (1983).
332 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (suggesting that such speech
may be treason); see also United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 606 (1995) (upholding
criminal punishment for releasing confidential information on the grounds that "[a]s to
one who voluntarily assumed a duty of confidentiality, governmental restrictions on disclo-
sure are not subject to the same stringent standards that would apply to efforts to impose
restrictions on unwilling members of the public"); Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S.
663, 668-69 (1991) (holding that the First Amendment doesn't give people a right to
breach nondisclosure agreements); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980)
(same).
33 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
334 See Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
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support an antiwar candidate.3 3 5 Such arguments and others like
them might well have helped the enemy if they weakened United
States' resolve, made it more likely that the United States would in-
deed withdraw, or emboldened the Viet Cong. Moreover, if the
speaker thought the Viet Cong was in the right, he might well have
wanted and intended the enemy to win.
Still, such antiwar speech should probably have been protected,
because it might well have contributed valuable arguments to an im-
portant public debate. And even if the speaker's intentions made him
morally culpable and thus theoretically deserving of punishment,
prohibiting all speech that intentionally helps the enemy risks punish-
ing even speakers who intend only to protect American interests, but
whose intentions are mistaken by prosecutors and juries.3 3 6
Perhaps the proper test in such treason cases is whether the
speaker was getting paid by the enemy3 3 7 or otherwise coordinated his
actions with the enemy.33 8 Perhaps the test could be whether the
speech was aimed at American voters generally or whether it was
aimed at soldiers specifically. Perhaps it should be something else al-
together; or perhaps I'm mistaken, and a sound First Amendment
analysis would conclude that the pro-Viet Cong speech I describe
should indeed have been unprotected.
But again, the test should be designed by recognizing that trea-
son law as applied to such speech is indeed a speech restriction, and
by inquiring whether the success of the war effort and the protection
of our soldiers justifies restricting the speech. It is a mistake to try to
avoid the First Amendment problem by categorically concluding that
speech which helps the enemy is conduct rather than speech, or that
treasonous speech is unproblematically punishable because the trea-
son statute is a law of general applicability.
Finally, courts need to develop First Amendment standards to
judge the constitutionality of laws that restrict professionals' speech to
335 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text; Tom Bell, Treasonous Speech, Tech-
nology, and the First Amendment (draft manuscript, available at http://
www.tomwbell.com/writings/Treason&Tech.pdf).
336 See Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 3, at 1182-95 (pointing out the
shortcomings of intent standards in free speech law).
337 This might indeed be a sort of conduct/speech distinction, but one that is focused
on what is truly a conduct element (receipt of money) rather than the content of what the
speech communicates. See Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 939, 941 (1st Cir.
1948).
338 See id. at 939 (holding that defendant's conduct constituted treason and not pro-
tected speech because "[h]e trafficked with the enemy and as their paid agent in the exe-
cution of a program ... designed by the enemy to weaken the power of the United States
to wage war successfully).
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clients; 3s 9 here too, Giboney and the speech/conduct distinction are
inadequate tools for developing such standards. Most of what many
lawyers, investment advisors, accountants, psychotherapists, and even
doctors do is speech. Even if we conclude that speech in special gov-
ernment-created fora, such as courtrooms, should be treated differ-
ently from other speech, that still doesn't address the many lawyer-
client relationships that consist simply of lawyers' advising their
clients.340
Professional-client speech, I think, should be subject to greater
regulation than speech to the public at large. For instance, licensing
requirements for professionals who give personalized advice should
probably be constitutionally permissible;3 41 a licensing requirement
for writing self-help books should be unconstitutional. Likewise,
seemingly unsound advice by a lawyer-including advice that includes
what the profession may view as unreasonable predictions, even when
no false statements of fact are involved-should be regulable; equally
bad recommendations in books and radio programs ought not be.
342
Similarly, laws constraining the sexual choices of advice book au-
thors or of movie stars who project an image of trustworthiness would
violate both the First Amendment3 43 and the Lawrence v. Texas3 44 sex-
ual autonomy right. Rules restricting psychotherapists from having
sex with their clients, on the other hand, are likely constitutional.
345
339 For a fine analysis of this issue, see Robert Kry, The "Watchman for Truth": Professional
Licensing and the First Amendment, 23 SErATrLE U. L. REv. 885 (2000). See also Schauer, The
Boundaries of the First Amendment, supra note 301, at 1783-84 (noting that "almost all of the
regulation of professionals" is "unencumbered by the First Amendment's constraints,"
though not discussing whether this is indeed proper).
340 See Kry, supra note 339, at 893 ("When a professional does no more than render
advice to a client, the government's interest in protecting the public from fraudulent or
incompetent practice is quite obviously directed at the expressive component of the profes-
sional's practice rather than the nonexpressive component (if such a component even
exists)."); cf Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient Discourse and the
Right to Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U. L. REv. 201 (1994) (discussing doctor-pa-
tient speech); Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional
Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 771 (1999) (discussing professional speech).
341 See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychiatry,
228 F.3d 1043, 1053-55 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding a licensing requirement for psychoana-
lysts). But see Kry, supra note 339, at 967-73 (arguing that such requirements should be
held unconstitutional).
342 See, e.g., Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123, 125-26 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (holding that a
diet book publisher couldn't constitutionally be held liable for the death of a reader from
complications caused by the diet).
343 A restriction on the. behavior of people who speak on certain subject matters
should be at least as unconstitutional as a tax on people who speak on certain subject
matters. SeeArk. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228-30 (1987).
344 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
345 See Caddy v. State, 764 So. 2d 625, 629-30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that
such restrictions don't violate the Florida Constitution's sexual autonomy guarantee as to
current patients, and as to former patients when applied "on a case by case basis with
consideration given to the nature, extent, and context of the professional relationship be-
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When a professional "takes the affairs of a client personally in hand
and purports to exercise judgment on behalf of the client in the light
of the client's individual needs and circumstances,"3 46 the govern-
ment may properly try to shield the client from the professional's in-
competence or abuse of trust.
At the same time, it's far from clear that the government should
be completely free to regulate professionals' speech to their clients.
For instance, I doubt that the government may simply ban doctors
from informing patients that marijuana is the best solution to their
problems. 347 Perhaps doctors could be prevented from writing rec-
ommendations that, by operation of state law, free patients from state
liability for marijuana possession, though even that is not clear.348 But
I'm fairly certain that doctors at least have the constitutional right to
inform their patients of the medical benefits of marijuana, and to
urge the patients to lobby their legislators to enact a medical mari-
juana exception.
Likewise, I doubt that it would be constitutional for the govern-
ment to prohibit psychotherapists or family counselors from advising
patients to get a divorce, or to ban the counselors from advocating (or
condemning) interracial marriages or adoptions. The Planned
Parenthood v. Casey3 49 Court may have been right to reject the doctors'
First Amendment objection to the informed consent requirement, but
the plurality opinion's dismissal of that objection was likely too quick:
All that is left of petitioners' argument is an asserted First Amend-
ment right of a physician not to provide information about the risks
tween the physician and the person," though holding unconstitutional a flat ban on all
sexual relationships with ex-patients)-
346 See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the result).
347 See Robert D. Goldstein, Reading Casey: Structuring the Woman's Decisionmaking Pro-
cess, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 787, 853, 860, 863-64, 866-67 (1996) (arguing that physi-
cian-patient speech should generally be constitutionally protected, at least when it conveys
valuable knowledge to the patient).
348 See Kry, supra note 339, at 894-95 (distinguishing pure advice from speech that
creates or affects a legal relationship, and arguing that the latter should be regulable).
Compare Pearson v. McCaffrey, 139 F. Supp. 2d 113, 121 (D.D.C. 2001) (holding that doc-
tors and patients may "freely discuss the risks and benefits of medicinal marjuana ...
[and] short of a prescription or recommendation for marijuana, the federal government
will not get involved in communication between doctors land] patients"), Conant v. Mc-
Caffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 698 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Giboney, and concluding that "[i]f
physicians' conduct, which could include speech, rises to the level of aiding and abetting
or conspiracy, in violation of valid federal statutes, such conduct is punishable under fed-
eral law," though not explaining when recommending marijuana constitutes aiding and
abetting or conspiracy and when it does not), and Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 20,
Walters v. Conant, 540 U.S. 946 (2003) (No. 03-40) (same), with Conant v. Walters, 309
F.3d 629, 637-38 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that doctor-patient speech about marijuana is
constitutionally protected) and id. at 643-44 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (stressing that a
prohibition on such speech violated the patients' rights as listeners as well as the doctors'
rights as speakers).
349 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
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of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the State. To
be sure, the physician's First Amendment rights not to speak are
implicated, see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705... (1977), but only
as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing
and regulation by the State, cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603...
(1977). We see no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that
the physician provide the information mandated by the State
here.3 5
0
Maybe there should be no restrictions on government-compelled speech
in the professional-client relationship, perhaps because such speech
compulsions don't keep the client from being informed. But if the
government prohibited doctors from informing their patients about all
the possible abortion procedures (including legal ones), or even
about procedures that are not themselves constitutionally protected,
such a prohibition may well be unconstitutional. 35'
Courts, then, need to answer some First Amendment questions.
First, in which kinds of relationships should speech be more regul-
able? For instance, what about professor-student relationships, career
advisor-advisee relationships, or fortuneteller-client relationships?352
Second, should the special doctrine be limited to personalized advice,
or should more general advice to the public also be more regulable?
'5 Id. at 884.
-151 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), upheld a restriction on government-funded
doctors informing patients about abortions; but the Court's decision rested entirely on the
restriction's being a condition attached to funding-nothing in the case suggests that the
result would be the same if the ban applied to all doctors, including privately funded ones.
352 Several courts have struck down bans on fortunetelling on First Amendment
grounds, concluding that such bans are content-based restrictions on the fortuneteller's
constitutionally protected opinions and predictions, but none of these decisions consid-
ered whether the fortuneteller-client relationship should be subject to lower scrutiny be-
cause the fortuneteller is a professional advisor. See Argello v. City of Lincoln, 143 F.3d
1152 (8th Cir. 1998); Trimble v. City of New Iberia, 73 F. Supp. 2d 659 (W.D, La. 1999);
Angeline v. Mahoning County Agr. Soc., 993 F. Supp. 627 (N.D. Ohio 1998); Rushman v.
City of Milwaukee, 959 F. Supp. 1040 (E.D. Wis. 1997); see also Spiritual Psychic Science
Church of Truth, Inc. v. City of Azusa, 703 P.2d 1119 (Cal. 1985) (applying the California
Constitution's free speech provision).
I've found only one case that allowed government regulation of professional-client
speech and considered the relevance of the fortune-telling cases: National Association for the
Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. California Board of Psychiatry, 228 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2000),
cited Spiritual Psychic Science Church of Truth, and distinguished it on the grounds that "Cali-
fornia's licensing scheme does not prohibit psychoanalysis [as did the anti-fortunetelling
ordinance), but merely regulates who can engage in it for a fee." See Nat7 Ass'n for the
Advancement of Psychoanalysis, 228 F.3d at 1056 n.9. This, though, can't be the right distinc-
tion by itself: If speech is protected from a content-based ban, then it's also normally pro-
tected from a content-based requirement that all people who engage in such speech for
money be licensed and trained. Cf, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State
Crime Victims Rd., 502 U.S. 105, 116-18 (1991) (holding that speech is just as protected
when sold as when it is distributed for free). Rather, the distinction must be that the
government has more authority to regulate psychotherapist-patient speech than fortune-
teller-client speech.
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Third, what should the test be: Should the government have a free
hand? Should it only allow restrictions aimed at protecting clients
from negligence or undue pressure?3 53
And again, whatever the right result might be, the "conduct-
speech" distinction is likely to be more misleading than helpful here.
When the government restricts professionals from speaking to their
clients, it's restricting speech, not conduct. And it's restricting the
speech precisely because of the message that the speech communi-
cates, or because of the harms that may flow from this message.3 54 The
restriction is not a "legitimate regu!ation of professional practice with
only incidental impact on speech";35 5 the impact on the speech is the
purpose of the restriction, not just an incidental matter. Such regula-
tion may be valid because of the harm that negligent speech can
cause, the potential value of the mandated speech to the patient or to
third parties, or the risk that the speech may exploit the patient's psy-
chological dependency on the speaker-but not because the regu-
lated speech is somehow conduct.
353 For an interesting recent controversy that raises this question, see Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 227(a) (4),
which bars debt relief agencies from "advis[ing] an assisted person or prospective assisted
person to incur more debt in contemplation of such person filing a case under this title or
to pay an attorney or bankruptcy petition preparer fee or charge for services performed as
part of preparing for or representing a debtor in a case under this tide." Is such personal
advice by debt relief agencies (a category that may include lawyers, see id. § 226(a) (3))
constitutionally protected speech? Some such advice may counsel people to engage in
unlawful fraud, and perhaps it may be punishable on that score (it's not obvious, given
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), that all counseling of fraud is constitutionally
unprotected outside the professional-client relationship, but perhaps the rule should be
different within such a relationship). But the provision also applies to counseling actions
that are likely legal, such as advising a debtor to borrow from creditors who would extend
credit fully knowing of the likely bankruptcy action-a plausible scenario if the creditors
are family members or if they would become secured creditors who are getting a property
interest as collateral. See Wudrick v. Clements, 451 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that
some debts in contemplation of bankruptcy are not fraudulent); In re Stern, 345 F.3d 1036,
1044 (9th Cir. 2003) (reaffirming Wudrick). Cf Garry Neustadter, 2005: A Consumer Bank-
ruptcy Odyssey (draft manuscript, on file with author) (discussing this issue); see also New
York State Bar Ass'n v. Reno, 999 F. Supp. 710 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that a similar
provision banning "counselling] or assist[ing] an individual [for a fee] to dispose of as-
sets... in order for the individual to become eligible for medical assistance" under certain
circumstances was likely unconstitutional; the government had conceded the issue in that
case); Magee v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D.R.I. 2000) (noting that the Justice
Department took the view that the restriction was unconstitutional).
354 See supra note 339.
355 Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (WhiteJ, concurring in the result); see also
State v. Niska, 380 N.W.2d 646, 649 (N.D. 1986) (using the same argument to justify a ban
on unlicensed dispensing of legal advice); Oregon State Bar v. Smith, 942 P.2d 793, 801
(Or. Ct, App. 1997) (upholding unauthorized practice of law statute on the grounds that it
focuses only on "the conduct of a profession-the practice of law").
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CONCLUSION
It is often tempting to dismiss First Amendment problems by
resorting to labels. "It's not speech," the argument goes, "it's con-
duct/contempt/libel/sedition/aiding and abetting/professional
speech." Sometimes, the dismissal is sound. For instance, some be-
havior is indeed conduct that is punished because of its noncommuni-
cative elements, not because of what it communicates. 3 56 Often the
label does capture something important even as to speech, though
only as a step in the First Amendment inquiry: Some speech that con-
stitutes aiding and abetting or common-law libel is indeed unpro-
tected, for reasons related to why criminal law or tort law seeks to
punish it.3 57
But sometimes the label is used as a substitute for serious First
Amendment analysis, rather than as the starting point for it; hence
the Court's repeated complaint about the government's attempting to
"foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels," 85s such
as by labeling speech "solicitation," "contempt," or "breach of the
peace." Sometimes such attempts are made by people who want to
justify restricting certain kinds of speech. Sometimes they are made
by people who want to protect other kinds of speech, and who there-
fore articulate supposedly absolutist First Amendment rules-for in-
stance, Justice Black's "no law means no law" 3 59-and dismiss
inconvenient counterexamples by calling them mere "conduct."3 60
I have argued above that we should resist this temptation. When
the law restricts speech because of what the speech communicates-
because the speech causes harms by persuading, informing, or offend-
ing-we shouldn't deny that the law is a speech restriction, and re-
quires some serious justification.
356 See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
357 See, e.g., Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 3, at 1174-76.
358 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963) (referring to the label "solicita-
tion"); see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (internal citations
and footnotes omitted) ("In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither pre-
cedent nor policy to give any more weight to the epithet 'libel' than we have to other 'mere
labels' of state law. Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the
peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the various other formulae for the re-
pression of expression that have been challenged in this Court, libel can claim no talis-
manic immunity from constitutional limitations.").
359 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., con-
curring); ROGER K NEWMAN, HuGo BLAc : A BzoGRAPHY 512 (1994).
-60 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting,
joined by Black,J.) (reasoning that profanity on a person's jacket is unprotected because it
is "mainly conduct and little speech"); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456-67 (1969)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (reasoning that "speech is... immune from prosecution," and
distinguishing falsely shouting fire in a crowded theatre on the grounds that such a shout is
.speech brigaded with action"); id. at 449-50 (Black, J., concurring) (endorsing Justice
Douglas's opinion); Van Alstyne, supra note 297, at 114 n.15 (faulting Justice Black for this
approach).
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Such justifications may at times be available. The Court has so
held as to incitement, false statements of fact, obscenity, threats, and
other unprotected categories of speech. Courts should also develop
similar rules for certain kinds of crime-facilitating speech, professional
speech, treasonous speech, and so on. But courts and scholars ought
to develop these rules with the recognition that the rules are indeed
speech restrictions-not by asserting that the rules merely restrict
"conduct."
